The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII. *October, 1912.* *No. 7.*

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit, c. 6.*

PUBLISHED BY

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

The
Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII. *October, 1912.* *No. 7.*

THE METAPHYSICS OF PRAGMATISM.

"Say that by it I hoped to round out my system, which now is too much like an arch built only on one side," wrote Prof. James in a memorandum a short while before his death in August, 1910, directing the publication of this volume,[1] in which he exposes the metaphysics of Pragmatism, and which, unfortunately, he was never able to complete.

For years James had cherished the purpose of stating coherently and systematically his views on the fundamental problems of metaphysics. He realized the fragmentariness of his empirical descriptive studies of mental phenomena, the importance of many problems suggested but not usually amplified there. He saw the inevitable demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of these questions. At the same time, his former works, with their statements of facts and laws scientifically established, offered a basis to which this special discussion could constantly refer for its own grounds in experience.

As occasion offered, it is true, Prof. James had gone more deeply into some of these questions, *e. g.*, in his volumes on: *Pragmatism,* and *A Pluralistic Universe.* But their interconnection and their bearing upon other problems remained

[1] *Some Principles of Philosophy,* by William James, Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1911.

to be established. And this he undertakes to do in the present volume, and carries out with a systematic conciseness and clarity begotten of long meditation and deepening insight. As the most mature expression of his thought it is of special value to the student of philosophy.

It is the study of the universe at large, not so much the description of its details, that we aim at in a consideration of these larger problems. If such a study meets at times with decided hostility in certain quarters; if the earnest seekers after elusive solutions have to suffer not infrequently "from man's native rudeness of mind which maliciously enjoys deriding long words and abstractions," and the philosopher is likened to "a blind man in a dark room, looking for a black hat that is not there," James' genial attitude towards all such "deriders of wise men" is well calculated to take the edge off their pointed shafts.

Philosophy in the full sense is only "man thinking," [2] thinking about generalities rather than about particulars; and if he find matter for puzzle and astonishment where no one else does, it can scarcely be denied that it is an essential part of a liberal education to know the chief rival attitudes towards life, as the history of human thinking has developed them, and to have heard some of the reasons they can give for themselves. "At a technical school a man may grow into a first-rate instrument for doing a certain job, but he may miss all the graciousness of mind suggested by the term liberal culture. He may remain a cad and not a gentleman, intellectually pinned down to his one narrow subject, literal, unable to suppose anything different from what he has seen, without imagination, atmosphere, or mental perspective." [3]

And as to the first whence and the last whither of the cosmic process, men will always eagerly inquire. Besides, how many metaphysical problems confront us, lying as it were, midway between those two extremes? What is thought, and what are

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 15.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

things? How are they connected? What do we mean when we say truth? How can there be a world at all, and might it as well not have been? What is God? How are mind and body joined? Do they act on each other? How does anything act on anything else? How can anything change, or grow out of another thing?

Or we may summarize all these questions and many others like them, with Kant, thus: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?

I.

It is on the answer to the first of these three questions that depend the answers that have been given in the past, and shall be given in the future, to the others. The limits and validity of our knowledge have thus become the foundation of all metaphysics.

James' metaphysics accordingly may be summed up in two words: the limits and validity of our knowledge are established by the pragmatic rule; and this in turn leads us in the end to conceive the cosmos as a pluralistic universe.

Rationalism and empiricism, according to James, have filled the history of metaphysics with their warfare. Rationalists are the men of principles; empiricists the men of acts. Rationalist thinking proceeds most willingly by going from wholes to parts, deducing facts from principles; while empiricist thinking proceeds by going from parts to wholes, and explains principles as inductions from facts.[4] Thus Plato, the arch-rationalist, explained the details of nature by their participation in "ideas," which all depended on the supreme idea of the "good."

Rationalist theories are usually optimistic, supplementing the experienced world by clean and pure ideal constructions, and claiming absolute finality for their system. Aristotle and Plato, the scholastics, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel, are examples of this.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

The temper of finality is foreign to empiricist minds. They aim at accuracy of detail rather than at completeness and are contented to be fragmentary. If they are dogmatic about their method of building "on hard facts," they are willing to be sceptical about the conclusions reached by the method at a given time. Socrates, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the two Mills, F. A. Lange, J. Dewey, F. C. S. Schiller, Bergson, and other contemporaries, are specimens of this type.[5]

If this classification seems rather arbitrary to us, suffering as it does, from overgeneralization, it is in the latter camp that James himself takes his stand. His psychological theory of cognition hinges on the distinction between percept and concept. "Things" are known to us by our senses and are called "presentations," to distinguish them from the "ideas" or "representations," which we may have without the help of our senses. The former may also be called sensations or percepts, feelings, intuition, the immediate flux of conscious life. The latter may be called concepts or thoughts. Sensation and thought in man are mingled; concepts flow out of percepts and into them again. Percepts are continuous, concepts are discrete; not in their being, for conception as an act is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each other in their several meanings. Each concept means just what it singly means, and nothing else. The perceptual flux as such, on the contrary, *means* nothing, and is but what it immediately *is,* a much-at-once, with no distinct boundaries, but showing duration, intensity, complexity or simplicity, interestingness, excitingness, pleasantness or their opposites.

Out of the aboriginal sensible muchness attention carves out objects, which conception then names and identifies forever: in the sky "constellations," on the earth, "beach," "sea," "cliff," "bushes"; out of time we cut "days and nights"; we say *what* each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstract *whats* are concepts. The intellectual life of man consist almost wholly in this substitution of the concept-

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

ual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes.[6]

The expression of the unvarying relations which the mind discovers between abstract concepts, and the combination of them, gave rise to various sciences. The value of these rests chiefly on the immutable character of the propositions they are composed of, as it raises them above the mere particular, transient facts.

This, according to James, is the rationalistic view; and because under this appellation he has included such widely divergent thinkers as Aristotle and Kant, he accuses rationalists of admitting that it is impossible to explain such concepts as God, perfection, eternity, infinity, immutability, identity, absolute beauty, truth, justice, freedom, necessity, duty, worth, as results of practical experience, as having their origin in sensible perception.

The empiricist view, he claims, holds that they do result from practical experience. And truly, Aristotle and the schoolmen would willingly subscribe to this particular dogma of James' empirical creed. Nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu, was their oft-repeated slogan. And it is strange that James should have been unaware of this point, or should have failed to grasp its full meaning.

But a more important question than that of the psychological origin of our concepts is that of their functional use and value,—the epistemological question of their truth.

In a concept, James holds, we must distinguish its *function* and its *content*. The concept "man" is three things: 1. the word itself; 2. a vague picture of the human form which has its own value in the way of beauty or not; 3. an instrument for symbolizing certain objects from which we may expect human treatment when occasion arises. Similarly, of triangle, cosine,—they have their *substantive* value, both as words and as images suggested; but they also have a *functional* value whenever they lead us elsewhere in discourse.[7] Whatever its sub-

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

stantive value may be, the more important part of a concept's significance consists in the consequences to which it leads. And these may either lie in the way of *making us think* or, in the way of *making us act.* Hence the use of the *pragmatic rule* in the interpretation of concepts. The Pragmatic Rule is: test every concept by the question: what sensible difference to anybody will its truth make; and you are in the best possible position for understanding what it means, and for discussing its importance. If questioning whether a certain concept be true or false, you can think of absolutely nothing that would practically differ in the two cases, you may assume that the alternative is meaningless, or that your concept is no distinct idea.

This rule applies to concepts of every order of complexity, from simple terms to propositions uniting many terms. "Particular consequences are the only criterions of a concept's meaning, and the only test of its truth"; [8] in other words, the significance of concepts consists always in their relation to perceptual particulars; [9] their essential office is to coalesce with percepts again, to bring us back to the fulness of original reality: the perceptual flux from which they have been originally distilled, and which is self-sufficing, as all lower creatures, in whom conscious life goes on by reflex action, sufficiently show.

The ascribing of causes to events and the uniform conditions that regulate those causes, as is done in physical science; the establishment of comparisons and identifications, as is done in mathematics; in short, the substitution of concepts and their connections for the immediate perceptual flow, widens enormously our mental panorama. Had we no concepts, we should live simply, "getting" each successive moment of experience, as the sessile sea-anemone on its rock receives whatever nourishment the wash of the waves may bring. But with concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the remote, actively turn

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 62.
[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

this way or that, bend our experience and make it tell us whither it is bound. We change its order, run it backwards, bring far bits together and separate near bits, jump about over its surface instead of plowing through its continuity, string its items on as many ideal diagrams as our mind can frame. All these are ways of *handling* the perceptual flux, and *meeting* distant parts of it; and as far as this primary function of conception goes, we can only conclude it to be a faculty superadded to our barely perceptual consciousness for its use in practically adapting us to a larger environment than that of which brutes take account. We *harness* perceptual reality in concepts in order to drive it better to our ends.[10] But these concepts must never be treated as if they gave a deeper quality of truth. The deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience; here alone do we acquaint ourselves with continuity or the immersion of one thing in another; here alone with self, with substance, with qualities, with activity in its various modes, with time, with cause, with change, with novelty, with tendency and with freedom.[11]

How this return to the primitive flux of life, to the flow of feeling "proves the essential identity of philosophy with science."[12] is indeed hard to understand. For science is nothing if not a carefully built-up system of fixed and immutable laws, far removed from the uncritical flow of the perceptions that come and go unceasingly in our daily life, and do not wholly leave us when we are asleep. It is also fallacious to think that this brings us in a closer contact with reality, with things as they are, unless we admit James' *a priori* idealistic assumption: that things are nothing but our percepts: "Certain grouped sensations are all that corporeal substances are known as; therefore the only meaning which the word 'matter' can claim is that it denotes such sensations and their groupings."[13] But this seems merely the supreme effort of idealism aux abois to bring us in contact with things at any

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 65.
[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 97.
[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 101.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 122-123.

price whatever, even if it be at the sacrifice of reason. As for the Pragmatic Rule, that practical consequences are the only test of a concept's truth, that we must value doctrine according to its result in conduct, James himself shows how arbitrary the application of it is in the examples he adduces.[14] Thus, he says, when we apply the Pragmatic Rule to the concept "God," we find that it means that "you can dismiss certain kinds of fear." But can we? That alternative supposition that God may exist, that consequently we may not dismiss certain kinds of fear, would be a truth "that makes some particular difference in the course of human experience." Again, to take another example of Prof. James: the application of the Pragmatic Rule to the concept "cause," means, he says, "that you may expect certain sequences." But what allows you to assert that they are merely "sequences" and not "products"? You are once more merely begging the question at issue by using the Pragmatic Rule. These examples go to show that the Pragmatic Rule is not what it is claimed to be: an ultimate criterion of truth, that "puts us in the best possible condition for understanding what a concept means, and for discussing its importance." On the contrary, it presupposes in the one using it, assent to a well-defined philosophical system with all its specific tenets and their consequences.

James' theory of "faith and the right to believe" stands in close relation to his pragmatic doctrine.

In most emergencies we have to act on probability and incur the risk of error. "Probability and possibility" are terms applied to things of the conditions of whose coming we are (to some degree at least) ignorant. If we are entirely ignorant of the conditions that make a thing come, we call it a bare possibility. If we know that some of the conditions already exist, it is for us in so far forth a "grounded possibility." It is in that case "probable" just in proportion as the said conditions are numerous, and few hindering conditions are in sight.

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

When the conditions are so numerous and confused that we can hardly follow them, we treat a thing as probable in proportion to the frequency with which things of that kind occur.[15] Now, the metaphysical and religious alternatives are largely of this kind. We have but this one life to make up our attitude towards them; no insurance company is there to cover us, and if we are wrong, our error, even though it be not as great as the old hell-fire theology pretended, may yet be momentous. In such questions as that of the *character* of the world, of life being moral in its essential meaning, of our playing a vital part therein, etc., it would seem as if a certain *wholeness* in our faith were necessary. To calculate the probabilities and act fractionally, and treat life one day as a farce, and another day as very serious business, would be to make the worst possible mess of it.[16] But is it not a fact made clear by psychological introspection, that faith is more than a question of mere probabilities? And does not experience confirm the fact that of many important truths we admit on faith—and we speak here of mere human faith—we are absolutely certain? If we were not,—if we were not certain of the existence of the city of Pekin, which we have never seen, of the existence of King George, whom we have never met—innumerable beliefs would be immediately wiped out of our lives as having no truth-value whatever. But human faith does give us certainty, derived from the testimony of others who know from empirical *evidence*. It ultimately rests on as firm a foundation as any one of that small body of truths which we have demonstrated and made evident to our own satisfaction.

Without thrusting in here any discussion of the supernatural—which would be disclaimed *a priori* as non-existent, —we may add that religious faith, in the same way, gives rise to an absolute certainty, which also ultimately rests on the authority of those who have seen and heard.

The Pragmatic Rule therefore falls very much short of all the advantages claimed for it as a criterion of truth.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 227-228.

II.

We must, however, investigate further the use Prof. James makes of it when he endeavors to ascertain the ultimate nature of reality.

Monism contends that there is only one being, an all-inclusive absolute, of which all other reality, whether facts or beings, are manifestations, a universe of "each in all and all in each."

To this conception James opposes his theory of "a pluralistic universe," holding that the entire cosmos, instead of being "a genuine unit," is but "a mass."

That this claim is most germane to experience no one will deny. As James well says: "the irreducible outness of *any* thing, however infinitesimal, from *any* thing else, in any respect would be enough, if it were solidly established, to ruin the monistic doctrine. And to say that there is no disconnection, that the separations we uncritically accept are illusory,—that reality does not exist in the shape of *eaches, everys, anys, either*s, but only in the shape of an *all* or a *whole,* is on the face of it simply silly, for we find practical disconnections without number. My pocket is disconnected with Mr. Morgan's bank account, and King Edward's mind is disconnected with this book." [17]

And James very pointedly punctures those vague hankerings after a "unity that is indescribable," after that wonderful, mystical "One," as exemplified not only in Plotinus and in Hindooism, but also in many modern pantheists.[18]

Scholasticism as he properly remarks, always stood for the doctrine that the universe forms a pluralism from the substance-point-of-view.[19] But, he says, its doctrine was too uncritical; for what does the use of the Pragmatic Rule tell us about the concept "substance"? What difference in practical experience is it supposed to make that we have each a personal

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 114-115.
[18] *Op. cit.*, pp. 116 ff., 138 ff.
[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

substantial principle? This difference, that we can remember and appropriate our past, calling it "mine." What difference that in this book there is a substantial principle? This, that certain optical and tactical sensations cling permanently together in a cluster. The fact that certain perceptual experiences do seem to *belong together* is thus all that the word "substance" means.[20]

In the same manner the "oneness" affirmed of the world is merely a name, like "substance," descriptive of the fact that certain *specific and verifiable connections* are found among the parts of the experiential flux. All the oneness in the universe is a "cognitional oneness," or as James puts it, through conceptual abstraction we get "what the oneness of the world is known-as."[21]

Things do not *belong* together, but are merely connected by the bare conjunctions "with" or "and."

Does this not jeopardize the world's rationality, and invalidate all formulation of scientific laws? No, "for it is sufficient that when oneness is predicated, it shall mean definitely ascertainable conjunctive forms."[22] This leaves room for "possibility," "novelty," "freedom," notions so native to our common sense. "Free will means nothing but real novelty; so pluralism accepts the notion of free will."[23] As a consequence pluralism is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but melioristic. While monism is a more emotional and religious view of the world, admitting that the world is saved already by its union with the divine absolute, pluralism is a more moral view, in this sense that it puts morality more in the foreground, and "thinks that the world may be saved on condition that its parts shall do their best."[24]

And it solves the problem of evil which remains a puzzle for monism; for if the absolute be the all-good, if Perfection be the source of all things, how should there be imperfection?

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 123.
[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 132.
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 143.
[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 140.
[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

For pluralism the problem of imperfection presents only the practical problem of how to get rid of it.[25]

Still, the question recurs: if free will exists, if "novelty" may be freely introduced in the world, are we not driven to the conclusion that "what comes, may have to be treated as a matter of chance," thus again defeating all our aims at scientific accuracy? We are led then to ask: in what manner does new being come? Is it through and thorough the consequence of older being, or is it a matter of chance so far as other being goes?

"So far as physical nature goes, few of us experience any real temptation to postulate any real novelty. The notion of eternal elements and their mixture serves us in so many ways, that we unhesitatingly adopt the theory that primordial being is unalterable in its attributes as well as in its quantity, and that the laws by which we describe its habits are uniform in the strictest mathematical sense." [26]

"It is when we come to human lives that our point of view changes. It is hard to imagine that "really" our own subjective experiences are only molecular arrangements, even though the molecules be conceived as beings of a psychic kind. A material fact may indeed be different from what we feel it to be; but what sense is there in saying that a feeling, which has no other reality than to be felt, is not as it *is* felt"? [27]

Thus again, while chance happenings are banished from the physical universe, liberty is assured to man.

One more difficulty remains to be removed. "The classic obstacle to pluralism has always been what is known as the principle of causality. This principle has been taken to mean that the effect in some way already exists in the cause. If this be so, the effect cannot be absolutely novel, and in no radical sense can pluralism be true." [28] Aristotle who made the first definite inquiry into causes, held that the "why" of anything is furnished by four principles: the material, formal,

[25] *Op. cit.*, p. 138.
[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 150.
[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 151.
[28] *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

efficient and final cause. But what one generally means by the cause of anything is its "efficient" cause. It is scholastically defined as "that which produces something else by a real activity proceeding from itself." This is unquestionably the view of common sense, and scholasticism is only common sense grown quite articulate." [29]

The scholastic doctrine certainly obviated the difficulties of monism, for which causation is merely a deducing of the identical from the identical. Scholasticism allows of effects that are really "products," that are really new, and yet not "chance products," for, "quidquid est in effectu debet esse prius aliquo modo in causa." Scholasticism always respected common sense, and escaped the frank denial of all genuine novelty by the vague qualification "aliquo modo." This allowed the effect to differ aliquo modo from its cause.[30] Yet, after acknowledging this much, James, under the pressure of an idealism from which he sees no escape, goes on to stultify this concept of causality because it is incomplete, because it does not include the essential note of activity.

This concept being an abstraction, it evidently does not include the note of activity as something immediately real, immediately experienced. In order then to get causality in all its completeness, James reduces it to a mere subjective feeling as experienced in the flux of life: "there is doubtless somewhere an original perceptual experience of the kind of thing we mean by causation. Where is this typical experience originally got? Evidently it is got in our own personal activity-situations. In all of these what we feel is that a previous field of "consciousness," containing (in the midst of its complexity) the idea of a result, develops gradually into another field in which that result either appears as accomplished, or else is prevented by obstacles against which we still feel ourselves to press. As I now write I am in one of these activity-situations. I "strive" after words, which I only half prefigure, but which, when they shall have come,

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 191. [30] *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

must satisfactorily complete the nascent sense I have of what they ought to be. Some of the words come wrong, and then I feel a resistance, not muscular but mental, which instigates a new instalment of my activity, accompanied by more or less feeling of exertion." [31] In such a continuously developing experiential series our concrete perception of causality is found in operation. If the word have any meaning at all, it must mean what we there live through. "The *percipi* in these original experiences is the *esse*. If there is anything hiding in the background, it ought not to be called causal agency, but should get itself another name." [32]

The fact remains, however, that these "perceptual experiences of causality" would mean nothing to us, "would make no difference in our lives," to apply the Pragmatic Rule,—if they were not conceptually apprehended, seized upon abstractedly from the here and now. The search for real causes in science and philosophy would dwindle to an enumeration of phenomenal antecedents; there would not even be a "search," for the word would have no meaning for a being not endowed with the power of abstraction.[33]

Moreover, this conception of causality is narrow and fragmentary in that it arbitrarily refuses to go beyond self, to be verified in the external world.

For, granted that this is a pluralistic universe, whence is it? The question harrasses the mind even more than it does in a monistic system whose absolute is eternal, and is continuously evolving phenomenal realities.

In a "piecemeal universe," where causation plays a real part, where the mind is constantly pursuing effects until it discovers the ultimate why, the thinker cannot escape the problem of an ultimate Being. Here James' philosophy falls lamentably short; all his subtle powers of reasoning seem to abandon him, and he agrees that there is no answer whatever to the

[31] *Op. cit.*, pp. 210-211. [32] *Op. cit.*, p. 213.

[33] It may be seen from the foregoing that James' ideas are closely connected with those of Bergson; and indeed, he himself claims intellectual kinship with this writer.

question. "No one has intelligibly banished the mystery of *fact*. Whether the original nothing burst into God and vanished, as night vanishes in day, while God thereupon became the creative principle of all lesser beings; or, whether all things have foisted and shaped themselves imperceptibly into existence, the same amount of existence has in the end to be begged by the philosopher. . . . For all of us *fact* forms a datum, a gift, or *Vorgefundenes,* which we cannot burrow under, explain or get behind. It makes itself somehow, and our business is far more with its what than with its whence or why." [34]

That this is one of the weakest spots in James' metaphysics, no one will deny, and James himself is well aware of it. There being no infinite primal cause,—which would be absurd, he says, since infinity connects with number,—James is finally driven to admit that "reality must in the end be begged piecemeal, not everlastingly deduced from other reality." [35] All concepts of the infinite he considers as inwardly absurd and contradictory, and "it is better to accept the opaquely given data of perception according to which additions to reality come in finite and perceptible changes like the successive drops by which a cask of water is filled, when whole drops fall into it or nothing." [36]

As an argument against the monistic hypothesis James' criticism of the infinite is final: a total is made up of parts, and parts are numerable, if not actually, at least potentially; if not by the imagination, then at least by the mind. But it is of no value when directed against an infinite *a se,* a being that is outside of space and time, and consequently does not fall within the categories of a standing or a growing infinite.

That a finite mind cannot know such an infinite is indeed "but a pseudo-problem." As the infinite is of a kind that transcends all being we have any immediate knowledge of, it can be conceived only by a process of analogy and negation, based however on perceptual experience.

[34] *Op. cit.,* pp. 44-45.
[35] *Op. cit.,* p. 165.
[36] *Op. cit.,* p. 172.

In the last analysis then the pluralistic universe is one to which there is no whence, no whither. Even the most biased thinker will hardly be satisfied with this arbitrary assumption and this truncated metaphysics. For it means the complete abdication of reason, which must no longer seek for an *explanation*; which must no longer seek to know things in general by their *ultimate* causes in so far as natural reason can attain to such knowledge; but must confine itself to a mere *description* of the universe in its details,—the very task that James himself deprecates as outside the scope of metaphysics. Moreover, if conduct is the most important thing in life, as Pragmatism holds, the whence and the whither of the cosmos and of man make so great a difference in our existence that Pragmatism falls doubly short in failing to take account of them.

J. B. Ceulemans.

ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON'S TREATMENT OF CATHOLICS.

In his *Memories and Portraits* Stevenson has set down a few passages which go far towards acquainting us with the why and the wherefore of the injustice generally meted out to Catholics by representative British Protestant authors. "Ignorance of his neighbors," he writes, "is the character of the typical John Bull. His is a domineering nature, steady in fight, imperious to command, but neither curious nor quick about the life of others. In French colonies, and still more in the Dutch, I have read that there is an immediate and lively contact between the dominant and the dominated race, that a certain sympathy is begotten, or at the least a transfusion of prejudices, making life easier for both. But the Englishman sits apart, bursting with pride and ignorance. He figures among his vassals in the hour of peace with the same disdainful air that led him on to victory. A passing enthusiasm for some foreign art or fashion may deceive the world; it cannot impose upon his intimates. He may be amused by a foreigner as by a monkey, but he will never condescend to study him with any patience. Miss Bird, an authoress with whom I profess myself in love, declares all the viands of Japan to be uneatable—a staggering pretension. So, when the Prince of Wales' marriage was celebrated at Mentone, by a dinner to the Mentonese, it was proposed to give them solid English fare—roast beef and plum pudding, and no tomfoolery. Here we have either pole of the Britannic folly. We will not eat the food of any foreigner; nor, when we have the chance, will we suffer him to eat of it himself."

That things have not changed very materially since these words were penned is evident from an English woman's recently published account of her trip into the interior of Africa (a work lately reviewed in the *New York Sun*), in which she

contrasts the sympathetic attitude of the French and Germans towards their wards with the Briton's indifference, pride and aloofness.

Long before his eyes had lighted on the above-quoted passages, the present writer said, in commenting upon Thackeray's *Irish Sketch Book*: "With all his great natural gifts, and with all the added helps of travel, Thackeray never wholly succeeded in shaking off his characteristically English insularity, narrow-mindedness, conceit, and one-sided way of looking at things. It seems to be an ineradicable feature of the Anglo-Saxon race. I am frank enough to admit that Thackeray was better than most of his fellow-countrymen in this respect; better far than Dickens, for instance, whose *Pictures from Italy* is little more than a vile caricature of the people whom he pretends to portray. Dickens didn't even take the trouble to *try* to understand the Italians. He entered Italy with a prejudiced mind; with nothing but contempt for its people and their ways. With the average Briton's smug self-complacency and abomination for everything that isn't British, he didn't want to be disillusioned. He judged the Italians by purely English standards; and if they failed to come up (or get down?) to his ideal—the British exemplar and beau-ideal—they didn't amount to much.

"I wouldn't dare to say this of Thackeray. I am convinced that he was guilty of no conscious injustice to the Irish. He meant to be fair and tried to be fair; and on a number of occasions, such as the one with which I am now concerned, he does the people ample justice. But I don't think it is any exaggeration to say that he really never got in touch with the common people—with the rank and file—and consequently never really understood the Irish as a people.

"For example, he speaks of the poverty of the Irish as though it were due, purely and simply, to their thriftlessness; seemingly forgetting that the tyranny and injustice of his own compatriots is responsible for their wretched condition. What a rich country! How fertile in resources! Why don't

the peasants till it? Why don't they engage in agriculture instead of begging and starving? Why, forsooth? Because England won't allow them. Because she has stolen from them the best portion of the soil which rightfully belongs to them, and turned it over to her own worthless minions, to be used as pleasure parks and hunting grounds.

"He writes, too, as though poverty and beggary were something peculiar to Ireland and practically unknown in his beloved Albion. Every one who has dipped into Booth's *In Darkest England* knows better than that. There is probably as much misery in the one city of London as in all Ireland put together. There may not be quite as many beggars, but there are certainly many more thieves.

"If the Irish beggar makes his request for alms in the Name of God, and accompanies it with a prayer, the cockney chronicler immediately scents rank hypocrisy. Does the gentle nun, leading a life of heroic self-denial, which to him seems intolerable, come to greet him with a happy, artless smile, instanter he suspects that her cheerful manner is merely assumed to hide her discontent. Let an old woman stumble in the midst of the Lord's Prayer; at once he sets it down to ignorance, never stopping to reflect that, in all likelihood, she is wont to recite her prayers in the Gaelic tongue. But of what use is it to heap up instances? It is the same all through the chapter. As a rule, the average Briton's sketches of Erin and Erin's people are little more than tissues of misrepresentations from start to finish. Let there be a half dozen sides to a picture, John Bull is always pretty sure to choose the darkest and worst. We Americans have gotten a taste of this kind of medicine ourselves in Dickens' *Martin Chuzzlewit* and *American Notes*."

It is no slander to say that, even after the typical John Bull has been intellectually convinced of the weakness of his position, it is exceedingly difficult to make him recede from it. Perhaps there is no other nation under Heaven in which prejudice is so deeply rooted as it is in the English. Cardinal

Newman shows this clearly enough in *The Present Position of Catholics in England.* And even the eminently fair and sincere Newman himself admits that he was not altogether free from this taint: "Simultaneously with Milner I read Newton on the Prophecies, and in consequence became most firmly convinced that the Pope was the Antichrist predicted by Daniel, St. Paul and St. John. My imagination was stained by the effects of this doctrine up to the year 1843; it had been obliterated from my reason and judgment at an earlier date; but the thought remained upon me as a sort of false conscience." (*Apologia Pro Vita Sua,* p. 7.)

But the strangest part of it all is that Robert Louis Stevenson, the Scotchman, should have been guilty time and again of the same identical fault which he was so quick to observe, and so justly condemned, in the typical Englishman. From one like Stevenson, a sort of latitudinarian, a man so generally broadminded and free from religious bigotry, we naturally expect a juster judgment than we could hope from one blinded by passion and prejudice; and from this point of view, Stevenson's strictures on Catholic persons and practices are more hurtful and more reprehensible than the criticisms of a Dickens, for instance.

I want to say, at the outset, that I intend to put down naught in malice to the brilliant Scotsman. If I should, I would be guilty of the very thing which he reprehends in John Bull and which I reprehend in him. Besides, there are few authors in the whole range of literature for whom I have a more genuine admiration, aye and even affection, than I have for this same Stevenson. Even apart from his literary works, he was a most lovable character; and it has been his good fortune to make friends, not only of those who came in contact with him during his lifetime, but of all the readers of his books; and we grasp with eagerness each and every detail that will throw a little more light on his all-too-short and useful life. Of many of the books which give us pleasure, we know but little of the authors and care less. The book

and the author are things apart. Not so with Robert Louis Stevenson. His books are clearly a reflection of himself. His thoughts and character, his tender sympathies, his child-nature with its poetic outlook on life and its perfect candor, shine forth behind the printed word on every page.

We may say of him with truth what Dr. Johnson said of Goldsmith: "Nihil quod tetigit non ornavit." As finished a stylist as ever wielded the pen, and a most versatile writer, he handled with perfect ease and success whatever he undertook. Whether it was the poem, the novel, or the essay, biography or history, the detective story or the drama, he was always seemingly in his element. And the wonder of it all is that one so afflicted through life should have been able to do anything at all worthy of note, let alone the heavy task which he set himself and accomplished so well.

Perhaps the most charming thing about Stevenson is his absolute frankness and lack of reserve, and I think we may safely apply to himself what he says of the Scotch peasant in the following passage from *Memories and Portraits*: "The speech of Englishmen is too often lacking in generous ardor, the better part of the man is too often withheld from the social commerce, and the contact of mind with mind evaded as with terror. A Scotch peasant will talk more liberally out of his own experience. He will not put you by with conversational counters and small jests; he will give you the best of himself, like one interested in life and man's chief end." And he adds a comment which serves both to illustrate further his own frankness, and to confirm what he and we have already said of the average Briton's prejudice and self-sufficiency: "The egoism of the Englishman is self-contained. He does not seek to proselyte. He takes no interest in Scotland or the Scotch, and, what is the unkindest cut of all, he does not care to justify his indifference. Give him the wages of going on and being an Englishman, that is all he asks; and in the meantime, while you associate with him, he would rather not be reminded of your baser origin. Compared with the grand,

tree-like self-sufficiency of his demeanor, the vanity and curiosity of the Scot seem uneasy, vulgar and immodest. That you should continually try to establish human and serious relations, that you should actually feel an interest in John Bull, and desire and invite a return of interest from him, may argue something more awake and lively in your mind, but it still puts you in the attitude of a suitor and a poor relation."

And yet this same man wrote in 1877—in his first published book, *An Inland Voyage*—"Independent America is still the cross of my existence; I cannot think of Farmer George without abhorrence; and I never feel more warmly toward my own land than when I see the stars and stripes, and remember what our empire might have been."

Liking Stevenson as we do, it is with pain and regret that we stumble, now and then, on the little slurs, and jests and witticisms upon people and things Catholic in the course of his earlier works. I say "in the course of his earlier works," for, as I hope to show in the sequel, his judgment underwent a happy evolution in this respect as he advanced in years and experience.

His first two books, *An Inland Voyage* and *Travels with a Donkey in the Cevennes* (published respectively in 1878 and 1879), contain quite a number of the painful and rather unjust criticisms to which I refer. In fact the parts that touch on Catholic matters are so like Dickens that, were it not for the difference in style, the reader might think they were penned by the author of the *Pictures from Italy*. Thus, in describing a service which he attended in the Cathedral of Noyon, he writes in a most flippant and irreverent strain, even going so far as to compare the service to a cheap comedy. Here is the account in his own words: "I was not averse, liking the theater so well, to sit out an act or two of the play, but I could never rightly make out the nature of the service I beheld. Four or five priests and as many choristers were singing Miserere before the high altar when I went in. There was no congregation but a few old women on chairs and old men

kneeling on the pavement. After a while a long train of young girls, walking two and two, began to descend the nave—the four first carrying a Virgin and child upon a table . . . . The priest who seemed of most consequence was a strange, down-looking old man. He kept mumbling prayers with his lips; but, as he looked upon me darkling, it did not seem as if prayer were uppermost in his heart. Two others, who bore the burden of the chant, were stout, brutal, military-looking men of forty, with bold, overfed eyes; they sang with some lustiness, and trolled forth 'Ave Mary' like a garrison catch. . . . As they (the girls) slowly footed up the aisle, each one took a moment's glance at the Englishman; and the big nun who played marshal fairly stared him out of countenance. As for the choristers, from first to last they misbehaved as only boys can misbehave, and cruelly marred the performance with their antics. . . . Indeed it would be difficult not to understand the Miserere, which I take to be the composition of an atheist. If it ever be a good thing to take such despondency to heart, the Miserere is the right music and a cathedral a fit scene. So far I am at one with the Catholics,—an odd name for them, after all? But why, in God's name, these holiday choristers? Why these priests, who steal wandering looks about the congregation while they feign to be at prayer? Why this fat nun who rudely arranges her procession and shakes delinquent virgins by the elbow? Why this spitting, and snuffing and forgetting of keys, and the thousand and one little misadventures that disturb a mind, laboriously edified with chants and organings? In any playhouse reverend fathers may see what can be done with a little art, and how, to move high sentiments, it is necessary to drill the supernumeraries and have every stool in its proper place."

It goes without saying that there is no excuse whatsoever for that kind of ranting; and even the author's most devoted admirers—of whom I count myself one—can but charitably opine that this flippancy, and gross irreverence, and comic opera indignation, must have been due to the fact that his

dinner sadly disagreed with him on that particular day. Evidently he came prepared to carp and criticise. Even supposing that things were as he paints them—and worse—we should think that charity, or even common sense, would induce him to make some allowance for the distractions incident to such an occasion, and would prevent him from forgetting that the participants were human beings, not angels. The long and the short of the matter is that Stevenson deliberately set himself to find fault with everything he saw and heard, and, consciously or unconsciously, magnified all the little human defects of the ceremony. His criticism is not even good-natured ridicule; it is rather the out-pouring of a sour and bilious stomach. Most ridiculous incidents occur frequently at Methodist revivals; yet I believe it is rare to find intelligent and reputable Catholic writers or speakers holding such happenings up to the scorn and contempt of their readers.

In the following passages Robert Louis goes even farther, if possible, in his bilious, splenetic hostility to Catholic practices. He is writing of something he saw at Pont St. Maxence, near Compiègne: "I found my way to the church, for there is always something to see about a church, whether living worshippers or dead men's tombs; you find there the deadliest earnest, and the hollowest deceit; and even where it is not a piece of history, it will be certain to leak out some contemporary gossip. It was scarcely so cold in the church as it was without, but it looked colder. The white nave was positively arctic to the eye; and the tawdriness of a Continental altar looked more forlorn than usual in the solitude and the bleak air. Two priests sat in the chancel reading and waiting penitents; and out in the nave one old woman was engaged in her devotions. It was a wonder how she was able to pass her beads when healthy young people were breathing in their palms and slapping their chests; but though this concerned me, I was yet more dispirited by the nature of her exercises. She went from chair to chair, from altar to altar, circumnavigating the church. To each shrine she dedicated an equal

number of beads and an equal length of time. Like a prudent capitalist with a somewhat cynical view of the commercial prospect, she desired to place her supplications in a great variety of heavenly securities. She would risk nothing on the credit of any single intercessor. Out of the whole company of saints and angels, not one but was to suppose himself her champion elect against the Great Assizes. I could only think of it as a dull, transparent jugglery, based upon unconscious unbelief.

"She was as dead an old woman as I ever saw; no more than bone and parchment, curiously put together. Her eyes, with which she interrogated mine, were vacant of sense. . . . But now that was all gone by, and had left her neither happier nor wiser; and the best she could do with her mornings was to come up here, into the cold church, and juggle for a slice of Heaven." And more to the same effect—usque ad nauseam. Even apart from the irreverent, we might almost say blasphemous, tone of these lines, and the disdainful conceit, and sense of superiority, and abnormal enlargement of cranium which they manifest, this is about as mean and as unprovoked a tirade as I have ever read. One would think the old woman had done him a mortal injury.

In this wise he continues his bitter and savage comments anent things of which he admits his utter ignorance; doing with a vengeance the very thing for which (in the opening passages of this article) he so severely censures the typical Englishman, out-bulling John Bull himself. "But there was something worse than foolishness placarded in the church of Creil. The 'Association of the Living Rosary' is responsible for that. . . . Indulgences, plenary and partial, follow on the performance of the duties of the association. . . . Where people serve the kingdom of heaven with a pass-book in their hands, I should be afraid lest they should carry the same commercial spirit into their dealings with their fellow-men, which would make a sad and sordid business of this life.

"There is one more article, however, of happier import.

'All these indulgences,' it appeared, 'are applicable to the souls in Purgatory.' For God's sake, ye ladies of Creil, apply them all to the souls in Purgatory without delay! Burns would take no hire for his last songs, preferring to serve his country out of unmixed love. Suppose you were to imitate the exciseman, mesdames, and even if the souls in Purgatory were not greatly bettered, some souls in Creil upon the Oise would find themselves none the worse either here or hereafter.

"I cannot help wondering, as I transcribe these notes, whether a Protestant, born and bred, is in a fit state to understand these signs, and do them what justice they deserve; and I cannot help answering that he is not. They cannot look so merely ugly and mean to the faithful as they do to me. I see that as clearly as a proposition in Euclid. For these believers are neither weak nor wicked. They can put up their tablet commending St. Joseph for his despatch as if he were still a village carpenter; they can recite the required dizaine, and metaphorically pocket the indulgences as if they had done a job for heaven. . . . I see it as plainly, I say, as a proposition in Euclid, that my Protestant mind has missed the point, and that there goes with these deformities some higher and more religious spirit than I dream."

No, my dear Robert Louis, a Protestant born and bred is not in a fit state to understand these signs and do them what justice they deserve, and you do well in answering that he is not. For once at least, you are right, and your ignorant and hyper-flippant comments are the best proof of it. Your "Protestant mind" has missed the point most assuredly. It really looks as though your "Protestant mind" might have undergone a change between the first rough draft of your impressions and the transcribing of them for publication. But doubtless you had taken such pains with them, and they looked so well on paper, and you were so pleased with your comic opera wrath and your superior knowledge both of this world and the next, that you couldn't resist the temptation to jot them down just as they were, with an apology at the end.

In his remarks anent the monks and the monastery of Our Lady of the Snows, near Vivarais or Ardeche (*Travels in the Cevennes*), while giving a truthful and accurate account of the industry and unworldliness of the brethren, he takes advantage of every occasion to "throw cold water" on themselves and their mode of life. It is not admiration, but pity, he has for these misguided men. The John Bull-ish narrow-mindedness and conceit, and the carping disposition, and the unsympathetic sneer, are clearly in evidence throughout his description. Thus, when "the good deacon had a permission to ask of them (the fathers and brothers) it was granted by a peculiar movement of the hands, almost like that of a dog's paws in swimming, or refused by the usual negative signs, and in either case with lowered eyelids and a certain air of contrition, as of a man who was steering very close to evil." (The evil in this case presumably Stevenson himself.)

However, in justice to Stevenson, it should be said that his description contains some compliments well worth quoting; and I quote them gladly, with much more pleasure than I have found in setting down his unjust and ignorant criticisms. "I am astonished, as I look back, at the freshness of face and cheerfulness of manner of all whom I beheld. A happier nor a healthier company I should scarcely suppose that I have ever seen. . . . But if they die easily, they must live healthily in the meantime, for they seemed all firm of flesh and high in color. . . . Those with whom I spoke were singularly sweet-tempered, with what I can only call a holy cheerfulness in air and conversation. There is a note, in the direction to visitors, telling them not to be offended at the curt speech of those who wait upon them, as it is proper to monks to speak little. The note might have been spared; to a man the hospitallers were all brimming with innocent talk and, in my experience of the monastery, it was easier to begin than to break off a conversation. With the exception of Father Michael, who was a man of the world, they showed themselves full of kind and healthy interest in all sorts of subjects—and not without a

certain pleasure in the sound of their own voices. . . . A long novitiate and every proof of constancy of mind and strength of body is required before admission to the order; but I could not find that many were discouraged. . . . This austere rule entitles a man to heaven as by right. When the Trappist sickens he quits not his habit; he lies in the bed of death as he has prayed and labored in his frugal and silent existence; and when the Liberator comes . . . joy bells break forth as for a marriage . . . and proclaim throughout the neighborhood that another soul has gone to God.

"At night I took my place in the gallery to hear Compline and Salve Regina. There were none of those circumstances which strike the Protestant as childish or tawdry in the public offices of Rome. A stern simplicity, heightened by the romance of the surroundings, spoke directly to the heart. I recall the whitewashed chapel, the hooded figures in the choir, the strong, manly singing, the silence that ensued, the sight of cowled heads bowed in prayer, etc."

Doubtless some of my readers will opine, after perusing these tributes, that I do Stevenson an injustice when I say that his description is tainted throughout with a miserable spirit of fault-finding. But if they will read the account for themselves, they may find that I am not far wrong. Besides, and unfortunately, his real opinion of the life of these good brethren —expressed later, in his poem on Our Lady of the Snows—is nothing short of the rankest materialism.

Aloof, unhelpful and unkind,
The prisoners of the iron mind,
Where nothing speaks except the hell
The unfraternal brothers dwell.
Poor, passionate men, still clothed afresh
With agonizing folds of flesh;
Whom the clear eyes solicit still
To some bold output of the will,
While fairy fancy far before
And musing Memory-Hold-the-door
Now to heroic death invite
And now uncurtain fresh delight:
O, little boots it thus to dwell

On the remote unneighbored hill.
O, to be up and doing, O
Unfearing and unshamed to go
In all the uproar and the press
About my human business.

And ye, O brethren, what if God,
When from heav'n's top he spies abroad,
And sees on this tormented stage
The noble war of mankind rage:
What if his vivifying eye,
O monks, should pass your corner by?

But ye?—O ye who linger still,
Here in your fortress on the hill,
With placid face, with tranquil breath,
The unsought volunteers of death,
Our cheerful General on high
With careless looks may pass you by.

It would require something more than genius to reconcile this with his previous admission of the Trappist's energy and usefulness even from a material point of view. In fact his poetic balderdash is so glaringly unjust that it makes us hesitate to give Robert Louis credit, at least in this one instance, for common sincerity.

The only priest whom Stevenson introduces into his novels (if I remember rightly) is Sir Oliver in *The Black Arrow*, and he is a criminal. Speaking of Du Chayla, Inspector of Missions in the Cevennes during the Huguenot troubles, Stevenson informs us that he was "a conscientious person who seems to have been intended by nature for a pirate. A missionary in his youth in China, he there suffered martyrdom, was left for dead, and only succored and brought back to life by the charity of a pariah. [And he adds, by way of comment] We must suppose the pariah devoid of second sight, and not purposely malicious in this act."

The only thing that can be said in extenuation of his unjust treatment of Catholics (if that can be termed a mitigating circumstance—for it seems to increase rather than diminish his guilt) is the candid admission which he makes, now and

then, that he *is* unfair and unjust. "I could hold more free communication with the Protestants, and judge them more justly than the Catholics. Father Apollinaris may pair off with my mountain Plymouth Brother as two guileless and devout old men; yet I ask myself if I had as ready a feeling for the virtues of the Trappist; or had I been a Catholic, if I should have felt so warmly to the dissenter."

Fully aware, as he was, of his utter inability to judge Catholics fairly and justly, why, in God's Name, did he attempt to judge them at all? Is that the part of an honorable and a broad-minded man? Is that the sort of treatment we should naturally expect from the man who berates the Englishman for his cocksureness and self-conceit? It may be said in answer to this that Stevenson's was "the spear that knows no brother," that he was every whit as severe on the foibles of his own co-religionists as he was on ours; and this statement is quite true. The truth is, Stevenson was but little, if any, more enamored of the Presbyterian church than he was of the Catholic; he was not even an orthodox Christian, in spite of the beautiful and touching prayers that issued from his pen. The tenets and practices of the church of his birth and rearing were utterly abhorrent to him, and no doubt if he had to choose between Presbyterianism and Catholicity, he would have found the latter far more congenial.

In his essay on Edinburgh, after telling us about the two sisters at their hideous twin devotions, thumbing their bibles, or praying aloud for each other's penitence with marrowy emphasis, and all the time hating each other like two devils, he remarks: "We are wonderful patient haters for conscience' sake up here in the North. . . . There is but a street between them in space, but a shadow between them in principle; and yet there they sit enchanted, and in damnatory accents pray for each other's growth in grace. . . . Indeed there are not many uproars in this world more dismal than that of the Sabbath bells in Edinburgh; the outcry of incongruous orthodoxies, calling on every separate conventicler to put up a pro-

test, each in his own synagogue, against 'right-hand extremes and left-hand defections.' And surely there are few worse extremes than this extremity of zeal, and few more deplorable defections than this disloyalty to Christian love."

Here are a few samples of his Presbyterian leanings, taken from his Scotch dialect poems:

(The Preacher.)

Himsel', meanwhile, frae whaur he cocks
An' bobs belaw the soundin'-box,
The treesures of his words unlocks
Wi' prodigality,
An' deals some unco dingin' knocks
To infidality.

Wi' sappy unction hoo he burkes
The hopes o' men that trust in works,
Expounds the fauts o' ither kirks,
An shaws the best o' them
No muckle better than mere Turks,
When a's confessed o' them.

(From "Embro Hie Kirk.")

While thus the lave o' mankind's lost
O' Scotland God still makes his boast—
Puir Scotland, on whase barren coast
A score or twa
Auld wives wi' mutches an' a hoast
Still keep his law.

In Scotland a wheen canty, plain,
Douce kintry-leevin' folk retain
The Truth—or did so aince—alane
Of a' men leevin';
An' noo just twa o' them remain—
Just Begg an' Niven.

(The Scot Abroad.)

An' still in ilka age an' station
Saw naething but abomination.
In thir uncovenantit lands
The gangrel Scot uplifts his hands
At lack of a' sectarian fush'n,
An' cauld releegious destitution.

He rins, puir man, frae place to place,
Tries a' their graceless means o' grace,
Preacher on preacher, kirk on kirk—
This yin a stot an' thon a stirk—
A bletherin' clan, no warth a preen,
As bad as Smith of Aiberdeen.

. . . . . .

O what a gale was on my speerit
Tae hear the p'ints o' doctrine clearit,
An' a' the horrors o' damnation
Set furth wi' faithfu' ministration!
Nae shauchlin testimony here—
We were a' damned, an' that was clear.
I owned, wi' gratitude an' wonder,
He was a pleisure to sit under.

Now turn we, with pleasure, to the bright side of the picture —for a truly bright side there is. If Stevenson did us great injustice in the beginning of his literary career, it may almost be said that he made ample amends for it as he grew in years and experience. In fact some of the finest and most heartfelt tributes ever paid to Catholic missionaries by outsiders have issued from his pen. I shall not dwell at any length on his noble and courageous defense of Father Damien against the mean, cowardly, un-Christian charges of the infamous Hyde. for it is a production so widely known as to need little or no comment, and one which will endear Stevenson to the heart of every Catholic, aye and to every lover of justice and fair play, as long as English literature shall last.

A more withering invective than this letter to the low-down, foul-mouthed and foul-minded Presbyterian preacher has rarely, if ever, been penned by the hand of man. And remember, Hyde was a co-religionist of Stevenson, a personal acquaintance, a man, moreover, from whom the author had received several marks of courtesy. But so deep and so genuine was Robert Louis' sense of truth and justice and fairness that it rose superior to every merely human consideration. "But there are duties," he writes, "which come before gratitude, and offences which justly divide friends, far more acquaintances. Your letter to the Rev. H. B. Gage is a document which, in my sight,

if you had filled me with bread when I was starving, if you had sat up to nurse my father when he lay a-dying, would yet absolve me from the bonds of gratitude. You know enough, doubtless, of the process of canonization to be aware that, a hundred years after the death of Damien, there will appear a man charged with the painful office of the Devil's Advocate. After that noble brother of mine, and of all frail clay, shall have lain a century at rest, one shall accuse, one defend him. The circumstance is unusual that the devil's advocate should be a volunteer, should be a member of a sect immediately rival, and should make haste to take upon himself his ugly office ere the bones are cold. . . . If I have at all learned the trade of using words to convey truth and to arouse emotion, you have at last furnished me with a subject. For it is in the interest of all mankind and the cause of public decency in every quarter of the world, not only that Damien should be righted, but that you and your letter should be displayed at length, in their true colors, to the public eye.

"To do this properly, I must begin by quoting you at large: I shall then proceed to criticise your utterance from several points of view, divine and human, in the course of which I shall attempt to draw again and with more specification the character of the dead saint whom it has pleased you to vilify: so much being done, I shall say farewell to you forever."

As those who have read the letter know full well, this is but a sample of the vigor which he brought to the complete overthrow of the mean little structure of the mean little skulking preacher. It speaks volumes for the nobleness and generosity of Stevenson's mind and heart, and shows clearly the mental evolution regarding things Catholic which had been going on in him with the passing of the years. So notable, in fact, is this gradual change of viewpoint, that we were half-minded to style the present article "The Catholic Evolution of Robert Louis Stevenson" instead of the caption which we finally pitched upon.

"With you, at last," he writes to Hyde, "I rejoice to feel

the button off the foil and to plunge home." And verily he did plunge home with a vengeance. In the whole realm of literature you will not find a more generous or a more complete act of justice than this letter of Robert Louis Stevenson—justice to the saintly Damien, justice, too, to his vile accuser lolling comfortably in his pretty house on Beretania St. "You belong, sir, to a sect—I believe my sect, and that in which my ancestors labored—which has enjoyed, and partly failed to utilise, an exceptional advantage in the islands of Hawaii. . . . This is not the place to enter into the degree or causes of their failure. One element alone is pertinent, and must be here plainly dealt with. In the course of their evangelical calling, they—or too many of them—grew rich. It may be news to you that the houses of missionaries are a cause of mocking on the streets of Honolulu. It will be news to you, at least, that when I returned your civil visit, the driver of my cab commented on the size, the taste and the comfort of your home. . . . But you see, sir, how you degrade better men to your own level; and it is needful that those who are to judge betwixt you and me, betwixt Damien and the devil's advocate, should understand your letter to have been penned in a house which could raise, and that very justly, the envy and the comments of the passers-by.

"Your sect (and remember, as far as any sect avows me, it is mine) has not done ill, in a worldly sense, in the Hawaiian kingdom. When calamity befell their innocent parishioners . . . a quid pro quo was to be looked for. . . . I know I am touching here upon a nerve acutely sensitive. I know that others of your colleagues look back on the inertia of your church, and the intrusive and decisive heroism of Damien, with something almost to be called remorse. But, sir, when we have failed, and another has succeeded; when we have stood by and another has stepped in; when we sit and grow bulky in our charming mansions, and a plain, uncouth peasant steps into the battle, under the eyes of God, and succors the afflicted, and consoles the dying, and is himself afflicted in his turn, and

dies upon the field of honor—the battle cannot be retrieved as your unhappy irritation has suggested. It is a lost battle and lost forever. One thing remained to you in your defeat—some rags of common honor; and these you have made haste to cast away."

No Catholic in the whole of the wide world could possibly have done better than that; few Catholics, in fact, could bring themselves to speak so plainly, and the few who could would have been set down as slanderers—filled with rabid prejudice and partisanship. Not one of them could have gotten the hearing accorded to Stevenson, or produced anything like the same conviction in his hearers. By this one act alone, I think Stevenson has fully atoned for previous slurs and slights, and made every Catholic, and every lover of fair play, his debtor; and I doubt not that this noble defense of Damien stood him in good stead when he appeared before the great white throne to render his account.

In the same spirit of justice and fair play, and with the self-same vigor, did he defend the cause of Mataafa, the deposed Catholic King of Samoa. All who have read his *Letters from Samoa* (1889-94) will recall the vehemence of his protests against the sometimes petty, and sometimes great, injustices inflicted upon this dusky Catholic chief by the civilized representatives of the Powers. Some who were in a position to know the inside history of this wretched affair, have said that the opposition to Mataafa was due, in a large measure, to his religious faith, and that a good deal of it was stirred up by American Bible, or proselytising, societies, probably the same sect to which our friend Hyde, the slanderer of the saintly Damien, belonged—the sect which Stevenson excoriates for devoting itself to the acquisition of filthy lucre in Hawaii, instead of trying to save the souls of the natives.

Now, of course, I am perfectly willing to grant that Stevenson's conduct in this matter was due to personal friendship for Mataafa, to admiration for the fine qualities of the Samoan ruler, and to that same sense of justice and fair play and

hatred of injustice which led him to right the wrongs of Damien. I am willing to grant that religion did not enter into the consideration at all, and that Stevenson would have done just as much for Mataafa had the latter been a pagan. Nevertheless, one thing is perfectly clear, to wit: that if Mataafa's religious faith did not induce our author to defend him, neither did it dissuade him from his noble, self-assumed task. It shows at least that there was not a shadow of bigotry in Stevenson's make-up, and it is another item on our bill of indebtedness to Robert Louis.

The following brief account of the ruined Mission of Carmel in California (*Across the Plains*), contrasting the former glory of Carmel with its present forlorn condition, and voicing his regret that the Mission is a thing of the past, could scarcely be more touching or sympathetic if penned by the hand of the most fervent Catholic: "The roof has fallen; the ground squirrel scampers on the graves; the holy bell of St. Charles is long dismounted; yet one day in every year the church awakens from silence, and the Indians return to worship in the church of their converted fathers. I have seen them trooping thither, young and old, in their clean print dresses, with those strange, handsome, melancholy features which seem predestined to be a national calamity, and it was notable to hear the old Latin words and old Gregorian music sung, with nasal fervor, and in a swift staccato style, by a trained chorus of Red Indian men and women. In the huts of the Rancherie they have ancient European Mass-books in which they study together to be perfect. An old blind man was their leader. With his eyes bandaged, and leaning on a staff, he was led into his place in church by a little grandchild. He had seen changes in the world since first he sang that music sixty years ago, when there was no gold and no Yankees, and he and his people lived in plenty under the wing of the kind priests. The mission church is in ruins; the Rancherie, they tell me, encroached upon by Yankee newcomers; the little age of gold is over for the Indian; but he has had a breathing space in

Carmel valley before he goes down to the dust with his red fathers."

Writing in much the same strain a little later, in his sketch of Monterey, he says: "In a comparison between what was and what is in California, the praisers of times past will fix upon the Indians of Carmello. The day of the Jesuit has gone by, the day of the Yankee has succeeded, and there is no one left to care for the converted savage. The mission church is roofless and ruinous; sea breezes and sea fogs, and the alternation of the rain and sunshine, daily widening the breaches and casting the crockets from the wall. As an antiquity in this new land, a quaint specimen of missionary architecture, and a memorial of good deeds, it had a triple claim to preservation from all thinking people; but neglect and abuse have been its portion. There is no sign of American interference save where a headboard has been torn from a grave to be a mark for pistol bullets. So it is with the Indians for whom it was erected. Their lands, I was told, are being yearly encroached upon by the neighboring American proprietor, and with that exception no man troubles his head of the Indians of Carmel. Only one day in the year, the day before our Guy Faux, the padre drives over the hill from Monterey; the little sacristy, which is the only covered portion of the church, is filled with seats and decorated for the service; the Indians troop together, their bright dresses contrasting with their dark and melancholy faces; and there, among a crowd of somewhat unsympathetic holiday-makers, you may hear God served with perhaps more touching circumstances than in any other temple under heaven. An Indian, stone blind and about eighty years of age, conducts the singing; other Indians compose the choir; yet they have the Gregorian music at their fingers' ends, and pronounce the Latin so correctly that I could follow the meaning as they sang. . . . I have never seen faces more vividly lit up with joy than the faces of those Indian singers. It was to them, not only the worship of God, nor an act by which they recalled and commemorated better days, but was besides

an exercise of culture, where all they knew of art and letters was united and expressed. And it made a man's heart sorry for the good fathers of yore who had taught them to dig and to reap, to read and to sing, who had given them European Mass-books which they still preserve and study in their cottages, and who had now passed away from all authority and influence in that land—to be succeeded by greedy land thieves and sacrilegious pistol-shots. So ugly a thing our Anglo-Saxon Protestantism may appear beside the doings of the Society of Jesus."

Such, in brief, are the two sides of the picture of Catholic life and people and influences given us by Robert Louis Stevenson; the one—the dark and unfair side—the crude and hasty judgment of a mind youthful, raw and callow, and (in spite of his better self and even unknown to himself) tainted with the unreasoning prejudices of his Presbyterian training; the other—the bright and fairer side—the ripe judgment and just verdict of his maturer years. When all is said—when his praise and his blame, his tributes and his censures, are weighed in the balance—I think we are safe in maintaining that the good outweighs the evil he has done us. If Stevenson erred—as he frequently did—in his earlier estimates of us, his errors must be attributed to thoughtlessness or unconscious prejudice, never to malice. His latest accounts of us certainly go a great way towards atoning for the faults and injustices of his earlier days, and after a deliberate survey of the field, we freely pardon the wrong he did us unwittingly and strain him to our embrace as *our* friend and the friend of truth everywhere as God gave him the light to see it.

John E. Graham.

THE PRINCIPLES OF GOSPEL-HARMONY.

It is sometimes urged that it is impossible, with the materials at our disposal, to construct any really satisfactory harmony of the Gospels. Whether this conclusion is a justifiable one or not is a moot question; certain it is, however, that from the very earliest days of the Church down to the present time men have endeavored—and presumably always will endeavor—to construct one harmonious and consecutive whole out of the four narratives handed down to us. We need only mention Tatian, Victor of Capua and St. Augustine in the earlier ages; Stroud, Father Coleridge, Rushebrooke and Wright in more recent days.[1]

And of all these harmonists no one absolutely endorses the views of his predecessors—a fact which lends countenance to the declaration that such an attempt is pre-ordained to failure. But of late years so much work has been done, both in England and on the Continent, for the settlement of what is known as the 'Synoptic Problem' that, in the minds of many, a solution of this vexed question is—if not imminent—at least not impossible. Whether we agree with this or not, it is at least certain that no satisfactory harmony can be constructed until a clear idea of the relations of the Synoptic Gospels to one another has been obtained. We are not here concerned, however, save indirectly, with the Synoptic Problem. Our object is rather the examination of the principles which should guide us in our endeavors to construct such a harmony of the three Synoptic narratives—for we may leave the Fourth Gospel out of consideration for the present—as shall satisfy the demands of modern scholarship while abating no jot or tittle of sound doctrine regarding inspiration.

Harmonists may be conveniently divided into two classes: those who take inspiration into account, and those who do not.

[1] A long list of such attempts will be found in Tischendorf's *Synopsis Evangelica*, pp. xii-xvi.

The latter class regard the question simply from the literary point of view and maintain that the fact that the narrative is inspired is no real factor in the case. There is a great deal to be said for this view. Whether inspired or not, the Gospels are a literary product and the problems they present to the student of literature are not affected by the fact that they are inspired. But on the other hand no final solution of a problem can be arrived at which fails to take into account *all* the factors of the case. Hence, while approaching the problem from the literary point of view, the Catholic exegete can never formulate a conclusion which conflicts with the doctrine of inspiration. For inspiration is the determining factor, any view which runs counter to it is of necessity false, though not every view which does full justice to the doctrine of inspiration is therefore true.

We have been careful to say that inspiration *must be taken into account* in arriving at any solution whether of the Synoptic Problem or of harmonistic difficulties. It is to be *taken into account,* it is not a *prime factor* in the case. In other words while the claims of an inspired document are a *conditio sine qua non* of an acceptable solution, they are not a determining principle by the aid of which we arrive at a solution. It is possible that neglect of this principle will explain the failure of many systems of harmonisation put forth in the past.

And another fertile source of failure has been the tacit identification of inspiration with revelation.

Thus, to take a few well-known examples of difficulties which have to be faced in all attempts at harmonisation:

Matth. xx. 30-34, tells us of *two* blind men whom Our Lord healed as He went out from Jericho. Mark, however, x. 46-52, and Luke xviii. 35-43, mention only *one*—Mark actually names him, Bartimaeus,—and they both tell us that the event took place as Our Lord was *entering into* Jericho.[2]

[2] Note Cajetan: 'Apud Matthaeum duo scribuntur caeci hoc in loco: quorum alterius tantum meminit Marcus, forte quia notior, et magis clamabat.'

Matth. VIII. 28, tells us of *two* demoniacs at Gerasa; Mark v. 2, and Luke VIII. 27, mention only *one* and their whole recital is colored by the fact that he was but one individual.[3]

These cases are familiar. How is a harmonist to treat them? The accounts are not revealed, if they were so we should have perforce to treat them as referring to distinct incidents; and this, as far as we are aware, no harmonist has attempted to do. But though not revealed the accounts are inspired, and divergences such as they present must be taken into account in arriving at an estimate of the real meaning of inspiration. We have a very similar case in the appeal made, according to Matth. xx. 20-23, by the *mother* of the sons of Zebedee, according to Mark x. 35-40, by the *sons themselves*. Now in the case of St. Peter's denials the apparent conflict between the questions and answers given us by the three Evangelists may be explained by supposing a chorus of voices, one said one thing, another another; but it is surely impossible to take refuge in such an explanation in the case of this appeal to sit at Our Lord's right hand. Can we suppose that mother and sons simultaneously put forward the petition? The whole character of the narrative is against such a supposition.

The above are patent instances of want of agreement; there are others which are not so evident but which on examination present perhaps greater difficulties. It will, however, be evident from the three instances given that we have to face an exceedingly delicate question: the Evangelists are inspired, how far did the gift of inspiration carry with it that of inerrancy? Were they always exact? Did their memories never play them false? In other words—and in the terms of the question immediately before us—can the Gospel narratives be completely harmonised? It is a common axiom among non-Catholic writers that we have not to take the inspiration of the Bible for granted, but have to prove it for ourselves by

[3] Cajetan: 'Marcus tamen tacens unum, non contradicit, saevioris enim creditur mentionem facere.'

study of each Book (see Bishop Welldon's paper in the *Nineteenth Century* for December, 1908). How this feat is to be accomplished we are never told—for obvious reasons! But the proposition might with truth be stated as follows: we must take the inspiration of the Gospels for granted since the Church tells us to do so; but nothing save examination of the Gospels themselves will tell us what was the *effect* of inspiration upon the Gospel-writers.

We are not here treating of inspiration in itself but it may be as well to state briefly what we hold with regard to it. In the first place, then, its *existence* has been defined repeatedly by the Church; its *nature* never. Following, however, on the lines laid down by the declarations of the Vatican Council, Sess. iii, cap. II. de Revel., repeated by Leo XIII in the Encyclical 'Providentissimus Deus,' and taught expressly by St. Thomas (Quodl. VII. qu: vi, i, ad 5m; 2da, 2dae, 173.4, etc.), we hold that the inspired writer is the instrument of God; that his relations to Him are the same as those which hold good between all instrumental and principal causes; that just as nothing flows from an instrument save as moved by the principal agent, so in the case of the inspired writer. And further; just as in every effect which flows from a series of subordinated causes there is something which is due to each of the causes which have combined to the production of that effect—they would not else have been applied—so in the case of inspiration. And lastly; just as in the above series of causes and effects there is always something produced by the immediate cause as well as something due to the cause which set that latter in motion, so in the case of an inspired writing, there is something which is due to the intermediate causes, but beyond that there is always something which is due solely to the first cause working for the production of the ultimate effect. This is not the place in which to develop these points, we have stated them succinctly in order to show that we allow no such thing as partial inspiration; there is no room in the Thomistic view for 'obiter dicta' or portions of the Gospel-narrative which are outside the influence of inspiration.

All is inspired or nothing. And all is equally inspired; there is no room for degrees of inspiration.

Hence, to return to the instances given above, when Matthew says there were *two* blind men and *two* demoniacs while Mark and Luke say there were only one of each, both are equally inspired. Similarly, when Matthew says Salome asked the question about her sons' place at Our Lord's right hand while Mark says that the sons themselves put the question—both are equally inspired. But can both be right? Are we not compelled to allow a lapse of memory somewhere?[4]

We are well aware that for many the fourfold or threefold narrative of Our Lord's life is regarded as a kind of childrens' puzzle in which all the disintegrated parts *can* be fitted together *if only you know the secret.* But when we ask for some proof of this, we never get beyond the angry insistence that the Gospels are *inspired!* But if we go further and ask: *why* should inspiration make for such an absolute harmony in the fourfold narrative? Either no answer is forthcoming, or—if one is attempted—it is only one which shows that inspiration has been taken for revelation and that the fundamental difference between these two concepts has never been realized.[5] Now there can be no doubt that these *à priori* views do an immense

[4] St. Augustine had no scruples: thus, apropos of the Commission to the Twelve as narrated in Mt. x, Mk. x, and Lk. x, he remarks that the context varies in all three narratives: "Sed utrum eum ex ordine Matthaeus subjunxerit, an ei ordo narrandi *recordatio* sua fuerit . . . . non apparet." A little later he says: "Itaque incertum est, utrum hoc quod agitur in ejus patria, Matthaeus omissum revocaverit; an Marcus recordatum anticipaverit; quisnam eorum ordinem *rei gestae*, et quis *recordationis* suae tenuerit."—*De Consensu*, II, 70, cp. 87.

Similarly: *Quaestionum Septemdecim in Matthaeum*, Qu. xv. "Nonnunquam sane alius Evangelista contexit, quod alius diversis temporibus dictum indicat. Non enim omnimodo secundum rerum gestarum ordinem, sed secundum suae quisque *recordationis facultatem*, narrationem quam exorsus est ordinavit."

[5] Note how careful Cajetan is to distinguish these two concepts; apropos of Luke, I. 2, he says: "Unde clare apparet Lucam scripsisse ex auditu ab Apostolis, et non ex divina revelatione sibi immediate facta; divina tamen gratia dirigente et servante ne in aliquo erraret."

deal of harm. For they give a rigidity to our views regarding the Bible which is in no sense justified by the facts. And the facts! How many who dogmatise about inspiration have a first-hand knowledge of the facts? Yet discussion is plainly impossible as long as the facts are not clearly grasped. It is not easy in the space at our disposal to present the facts in anything approaching a satisfactory manner and we must content ourselves with a selection.

In Matth. xix Our Lord is presented as taking His final leave of Galilee and He passes over into Perea.[6] Two chapters here, and one in Mark, cover the whole of this journey, and after leaving Jericho Our Lord makes His way into Jerusalem for the day of the Palms. The events as presented to us in these chapters may be tabulated as follows:

a) Answer to the Pharisees on the indissolubility of marriage. Matth. xix, 1-12; Mark, x, 1-12.

b) Little children are brought to Him. Matth. xix, 13-15; Mark, x, 13-16.

c) The rich young man goes sorrowfully away. Matth. xix, 16-22; Mark, x, 17-22.

d) Resulting lessons regarding the danger of riches. Matth. xix, 23-26; Mark, x, 23-27.

e) Peter's consequent request to know what reward they should have since they actually had done what the rich young man had failed to do, viz., leave all and follow Him. Matth. xix, 27-30; Mark, x, 28-31.

Matthew follows this up by the parable of the laborers in the vineyard as an enforcement of the promise that the last shall be first.

f) The last prediction of the coming Passion. Matth. xx. 17-19; Mark, 32-34.

g) The petition of the sons of Zebedee—or of their mother for them. Matth. xx, 20-24; Mark, x, 35-40.

Then comes the final journey from Jericho to the Holy

[6] The actual text is disputed—cf. the parallel in Mark x,—but that need not concern us here.

City. All this is straightforward and if we had only the two first Gospels there would be no difficulty. But St. Luke's treatment of this period of Our Lord's ministry is entirely different. As is well known he makes the final departure from Galilee coincide with a period shortly after the Transfiguration and devotes a very long section, IX, 52–XIX, 27 to this last journey. This section is the crux of all harmonists. Is the scene laid in Samaria, or in Perea, or in both? Does St. Luke mean that it was one long journey or has he grouped together the events of several journeys? Are the events narrated merely the same as those given by Matthew and Mark or are they repetitions due to the new environment in which Our Lord found Himself? Are, for example, the parables of the hundred sheep, the mustard seed, and the leaven the same as those given us by Matthew and Mark, or are they repetitions due to Our Lord Himself? These are the obvious difficulties which suggest themselves as we read; but there are others which, though not so obvious, are yet of even greater importance, thus:

In Luke, XVI, 14-18, we have a passage, or series of passages, which merit careful study. They follow immediately upon the parable of the Unjust Steward and are followed in turn by that of Dives and Lazarus. We give them in full.

14 Now the Pharisees who were covetous, heard all these things: and they derided him.
15 And he said to them: You are they who justify yourselves before men, but God knoweth your hearts; for that which is high to men, is an abomination before God.
16 The law and the prophets were until John; from that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every one useth violence towards it.
17 And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail.
18 Every one that putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her that is put away from her husband, committeth adultery.

What is the connection between these verses and the preceding and following parables? Is there any at all? We may

say at once that vv. 14-15 do clearly follow upon the preceding parable and find their echo both in it and in that of Dives and Lazarus. But what about vv. 17-18? Is it possible, without unduly forcing the text, to establish any valid connection between these verses and the rest? Cajetan certainly does so and so also does Plummer in the *International Critical Commentary*. According to them the train of thought will be as follows: the Pharisees trusted in the Law but it is now replaced by the preaching of the Kingdom, v. 16; yet the Law shall not pass away as far as its moral teaching goes, v. 17; and one special example of this is presented in the statement regarding the indissolubility of marriage, a point on which the Pharisees seem to have been particularly lax. The parable of Dives and Lazarus then follows—perhaps as an example of the fate of a Pharisee who gloried in the sonship of Abraham but did not practise the Law in its true spirit.

Now we are far from denying that this train of thought may be discovered in the verses in question. It is probably precisely what St. Luke meant us to see in the verses; but there is a more serious difficulty. Is it conceivable that Our Lord spoke those four verses as they stand? The thought is so condensed as to be really obscure and we can never believe that Our Lord was obscure. But if the condensed form of expression is not due to Our Lord is must be due to St. Luke, and we must suppose that he has given us in an abbreviated form only the barest outline of the discourse actually spoken. We remember that we are in Perea—for it is the commoner view that these parables are to be referred to a trans-Jordanic circuit,—if we now turn to Matth. XIX and Mark X we find that in the course of this Perean ministry Our Lord did treat at considerable length of the indissolubility of marriage and that the words which St. Luke gives us in XVI, 16, are but the *conclusion* of that discourse and have been torn from their context. In other words the pictures and the parables are what interest the artist and for their sake he has sacrificed the discourse. This may seem startling but it is not an isolated

instance. If we turn to the next chapter, XVII, 1-4, we find ourselves in presence of a similar phenomenon.

And he said to his disciples: It is impossible that scandals should not come: but wo to him through whom they come.
2 It were better for him, that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea, than that he should scandalize one of these little ones.
3 Take heed to yourselves. If thy brother sin against thee, reprove him: and if he do penance, forgive him.
4 And if he sin against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day be converted unto thee, saying, I repent: forgive him.

These words follow immediately upon the parable of Dives and Lazarus. The first two verses treat of scandal, the next two of forgiveness of offences. It is impossible for even the most conservative exegesis to establish any connexion between them. Nor indeed is there the remotest need for doing so. An examination of the two sections will show that they, too, like the preceding one, have been torn from their context. This is particularly noticeable in the first of the two. For what is the meaning of the words: '*these* little ones'? No 'little ones' have so far been mentioned. We turn to the parallel in Matthew and Mark, and the reason for the insertion of the words is at once apparent: they are the *conclusion* of the discourses about humility which Jesus had illustrated by putting a little child in their midst, cf. Matth. XVIII, 1-14, Mark, IX, 33-41, where it should be noted in addition that according to the two former Evangelists this event happened *before* the departure from Galilee. When we turn now to the second section, that regarding forgiveness, we find that it also is but an echo of words in the same chapter of St. Matthew, XVIII, 21-22, words which Matthew illustrates by the parable of the Unmerciful Servant. It is noticeable that Mark has not got this passage, but still more noticeable that in Luke the saying loses half its force owing to the omission of the statement that it was an answer to a question by St. Peter.

* * * * * * *

Now any purely mechanical idea of inspiration is rendered impossible by facts like these. The Evangelists were men and retained their liberty—albeit inspired. It is here that real study of the Gospels is called for. What were these Evangelists as men? We can only learn this from their Gospels—with perhaps some little help from tradition.

But before proceeding further it will be well to clear the ground by setting forth certain principles of Gospel exegesis, principles which are only too often neglected:

a) While the Gospels do present us with a fourfold picture of Our Blessed Lord we must be careful to bear in mind that it is a *picture* and nothing more; the Gospels are in no sense biographies.

b) The Evangelists were *inspired*—consequently what they record most certainly happened.

c) Not one of the authors of the Synoptic Gospels as we now have them, was an *eyewitness* of all that he relates. It is necessary to insist on this for it is often forgotten. St. Matthew's Gospel was written by him in Aramaic according to the consentient testimony of tradition, and he was of course an eye-witness of much that he describes. But we can only profess profound ignorance of the authorship of the Greek translation we now have;[7] some even go so far as to maintain that it bears signs of being no translation at all, for the Greek —though tinged with Hebraisms—has not the appearance of a translation. It is possible of course that St. Matthew himself was its author, but this is mere conjecture. St. Luke, by his own showing, was not an eye-witness of the events he relates; the same must be said of St. Mark, though he approaches more nearly to the character of an eye-witness since, according to the testimony of Papias, St. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, he was the interpreter of St. Peter and composed his Gospel from his reminiscences of the latter's

[7] "Matthaeus . . . . primus in Judaea propter eos qui ex circumcisione crediderant, Evangelium Christi Hebraicis literis verbisque composuit. Quod quis postea in Graecum transtulerit, non satis certum est."—St. Jerome, *Vita S. Matthaei in Libro de Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus.*

preaching. It is this fact which gives such a life-like character to St. Mark's narrative.

d) The *destination* of each Gospel is tolerably clear from tradition and from their contents. Thus St. Matthew's is essentially the 'Gospel of the Hebrews';—his aim is to prove to the Jews the Messianic character of Our Lord. St. Mark is a Hebrew writing for the Gentiles; his is essentially a Greek Gospel even though the writer is a Hebrew. St. Luke, again, is a Greek writing for Greeks and Romans, and, if there is an Aramaic tinge discernible now and again, this is due not to the writer but to the sources at his disposal. Hence each Evangelist has his prepossessions; he has a certain goal in view and the impress of his own character is necessarily stamped upon his Gospel. This feature of the Gospels gave rise to the application to the Evangelists of the cherubim of Ezechiel's vision; the titles of the Man, the Lion, and the Ox—even though not always consistently applied—show us how clearly the Fathers of the Church had grasped the 'unity in variety' of the Gospels.

e) A further study of the several Evangelists will bring out other features. The natural bent of each shaped the Gospel he produced. Thus St. Matthew, while adhering to a historical framework which in the main accords with that followed by St. Mark and St. Luke, yet makes no pretence to keep to the historical order of events in detail. This fact has always been recognized but its import has not always been insisted on sufficiently. There can hardly be question that he groups together the miracles, chs. VIII-IX; the parables, ch. XIII; and the doctrinal teaching, chs. V-VII. But what a tremendous fact this is! It puts St. Matthew out of our calculations when endeavoring to construct a harmony. A comparison between the Sermon on the Mount and St. Luke VI and XII will be sufficient indication of this.

St. Mark, on the other hand, though preserving the same general lines as St. Matthew, has quite a different object in view. It used to be said that in St. Matthew's Gospel we had a species of 'Summa Praedicabilium' which closely approached

the summary of Gospel-preaching drawn up, according to tradition, by the Apostles before they dispersed. This may be partly true, but it is much more true to facts to term St. Mark's Gospel such a 'Summa Praedicabilium'; for he owed his Gospel, as Papias expressly tells us, to St. Peter's preaching. Papias' words are well-known, but they will bear repetition: 'This also the Presbyter said: Mark, having become the interpreter of Peter, wrote down accurately, though not indeed in order, whatsoever he remembered of the things said or done by Christ. For he neither heard the Lord nor followed Him, but afterwards, as I said, he followed Peter who adapted his teaching to the needs of his hearers, but with no intention of giving a connected account of the Lord's discourses, so that Mark committed no error while he thus wrote some things as he remembered them. For he was careful of one thing, not to omit any of the things which he had heard, and not to state any of them falsely.' (*H. E.* III, 39.)

St. Luke's Preface is the best testimony to the style of Gospel-narrative which he wished to produce. He claims to write in orderly and historical fashion, and therefore we are bound to accept his Gospel as a chronological narrative in the main—though reservations may be necessary at times for, be it noted, St. Luke nowhere binds himself down to adhere rigidly to this historical order and there is good ground for thinking that at times he deserts it. But above all St. Luke is the artist. St. Mark may be vivid and picturesque but his are not studied pictures, they owe their vivacity to the fact that St. Peter himself saw what he described. In St. Luke's case it is different. His pictures are thrown on the canvas with consummate skill. We feel that in describing the scenes in his first two chapters he is painting in words.

But again, he, too, has certain prepossessions, that is to say, certain details appeal to him more than others. What pictures of women he has painted for us! How he dwells upon Our Lord's prayers;[8] how much, too, of the general teach-

[8] "Marcus discipulus et interpres Petri, juxta quod Petrum referentem audierat, rogatus Romae a fratribus, breve scripsit Evangelium. Quod

ing regarding prayer we owe to him! And the Divine compassion! It appears, of course, in the other Gospels, but if we want to preach on mercy we somehow instinctively turn to the third Gospel. Then, again, his non-Jewish origin comes out prominently when he tells us of the universality of the Gospel, and it is here that his dislike of the Jews appears so strongly, as also in Acts.[9]

* * * * * * *

Now it is clear that in estimating the value of any section of the Gospels,—when attempting a harmony of them—we must bear in mind the above characteristics of each Evangelist.

Thus, for example, if we ask where we are to place the 'Pater Noster' in our scheme, we have to face the fact that while St. Matthew definitely assigns it a place in the Sermon on the Mount, VI. 9-13; St. Luke equally definitely assigns it to a much later period, viz., the Perean preaching, XI. 2-4, and—what is more, omits some of the clauses. It is easy to reply that Our Lord repeated His teaching; He probably did so, but are we to apply this easy solution to every individual case? And on the other hand, if it can be shown—as appears more than probable,—that St. Matthew actually does group together details of Our Lord's teaching, and if at the same time it is conceded that St. Luke is generally careful about the geographical and thus—by implication—of the historical order of events, then it would seem that we have good ground for saying that the 'Pater Noster' was only once delivered

cum Petrus audisset, probavit, et Ecclesiae legendum sua auctoritate edidit: sicut Clemens in sexto Hypotyposeon libro scribit."—St. Jerome, *Vita S. Marci in lib. de Scriptoribus Illustribus.*

"Secundus Marcus interpres Apostoli Petri . . . . qui Dominum quidem Salvatorem ipse non vidit, sed ea quae audierat magistrum praedicantem, juxta fidem magis gestorum narravit quam ordinem."—From St. Jerome's *Preface to Comment. on the Gospel of St. Matthew.*

[9] "Igitur Evangelium sicut audierat, scripsit; Acta vero Apostolorum, sicut viderat, composuit."—St. Jerome, *Vita S. Lucae in lib. de Scriptoribus Illustribus.*

"Tertius Lucas medicus . . . . ut ipse in proemio confitetur, audita magis quam visa describens.—*Ibid.*

and that St. Matthew has put it out of its due place. At the same time we must not be understood as insisting upon the application of this principle in every case; far from it; we have chosen the instance of the 'Pater Noster' simply because it is a striking one. But this 'grouping' tendency on the part of St. Matthew may throw light on his procedure when he tells of *two* demoniacs and *two* blind men outside Jericho. It is at least conceivable that here also he has lumped together miracles. If the fact that he was inspired did not preclude him from grouping together points of teaching in the Sermon on the Mount why should it preclude him from a similar procedure when narrating miracles? When we now turn to St. Mark we are brought face to face with still graver problems. His Gospel is but a reminiscence of St. Peter's preaching. And yet he must have heard St. Peter repeat his sermons again and again! And surely we need not suppose that St. Peter always repeated them in the same way? Thus, to take an example already brought forward, when St. Peter told his hearers the story of the sons of Zebedee and their petition need we believe that he always said it was *they* who made the request rather than their mother? For it is certain that whichever was the spokesman did but voice the sentiments of the other. Hence it is quite conceivable that St. Peter may have sometimes stated the request as emanating from John and James, and at other times have given it as actually voiced by Salome. Or again, on the supposition that St. Peter was always careful to repeat himself in the same words—an incredible supposition—need we suppose that St. Mark always *remembered* the precise order in which St. Peter presented the facts? Papias' words seem to give the lie to such a supposition: 'Mark . . . wrote down accurately, though not indeed in order, whatsoever he remembered of the things said or done by Christ.'

But the case of St. Luke is even more complex. We have seen that he was an artist, that he had certain prepossessions, that he was a Greek with probably small knowledge of Palestine and of Jewish customs. Even more, then, than the others is he dependent on authority and tradition for his details.

Had he ever walked by the Sea of Galilee? Had he ever been in Perea where he laid the scene of so much of Our Lord's ministry? Mark may possibly have been the young man who threw away his garment in the garden; Matthew was certainly the man who 'sat at the receipt of custom'; and John, of course, had reclined on his Master's bosom. But Luke had done none of these things. Probably he had never even set eyes on the 'Word made Flesh.' We are not denying that he had first-rate authorities for all that he says. We get glimpses of these authorities now and again; the Blessed Virgin; St. James, the bishop of Jerusalem; St. Philip the Evangelist; possibly, too, St. Peter himself when St. Paul went to pay him his formal visit at Jerusalem, and again at Rome. But what kind of information did they give him? Much of it may have been in writing; this is almost certainly the case with that furnished by Our Blessed Lady, viz.: the first two chapters. Some of it may have been in Aramaic, traces of this may be discerned in the first two chapters and in other parts, *e. g.,* in the story of Zacheus. But are we precluded from supposing that much of it was fragmentary? Not in the least, for we are not allowed to multiply miracles. And a further question: need St. Luke have remembered it all quite accurately? Dates, places, and occasions—does his inspiration extend to an accurate preservation of all these? And when St. Luke came to edit all his laborious collection—must he not have treated his materials as any ordinary compiler would have done? Would inspiration necessarily supply gaps? If he thought his informant said that a certain event took place in Galilee whereas it really took place in Perea—would inspiration come to his rescue? [10]

[10] St. Augustine's treatment of a similar difficulty is well deserving of study, all the more that it is too much the fashion to sneer at what are termed his 'harmonistic devices.' He remarks that there is a great difference between 'whose shoes I am not worthy to carry' (Matthew, III, 11), and 'the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and loose' (Mark, I, 7); "Non enim verbis aut verborum ordine, aut aliquo genere locutionis, sed etiam *re ipsa* videtur aliud esse calceamenta portare, aliud corrigiam calceamenti solvere." He suggests that the Baptist *might*

These are delicate questions and we have no wish to answer them all in the negative. Inspiration would certainly preclude the Evangelist from making positively false assertions. But that is not the same as saying that he often suspended his judgment and left things vague and doubtful where he was not sure. An examination of some passages will make our meaning clear.

St. Luke is often chary of assigning names to persons and places. We are sometimes told that this was because he was writing for Gentiles who were not familiar with Palestinian places and people and for whom such details would have been

have said both and that one Evangelist remembered one, another the other. But he concludes with the enunciation of a principle the breadth and far-reaching consequences of which can hardly be exaggerated:

"If, then, one asks what John the Baptist did really say, whether he said what Matthew assigns to him or what Luke gives him, or only the few words which Mark mentions him as saying while he is silent about the rest: it will be readily answered that such labor is vain when once we rightly grasp the fact that their very phrases (ipsas sententias) were necessary for our arriving at the truth—whatever words they may have used to express them. For, that one gives us a different order of the words from another implies no contradiction. Neither is there any contradiction if one gives what another omits. For it is clear that each one gave the facts as he remembered them and according as it came into the mind of each to state his ideas briefly or at length. . . . Hence it is clear that when several are stating their reminiscences of something they heard or seen, none of them are guilty of falsehood merely because they do not state it in the same way or in the same terms—while yet it is the same thing which is stated. And the same principle applies when it is question of changes in the order of words; or when one uses different words from another—though words which mean the same thing; or when something is omitted which either did not occur to his memory or which could easily be gathered from what another had said; or again when, amongst other things which he had decided to relate, a writer thought fit—for the sake of proportion—to merely touch upon and not fully detail certain things; or if, on the contrary, for the purpose of throwing light on and fully stating something, an author added, not facts, but words—authority for which is conceded when it is question of narration; or if, finally, while thoroughly understanding the matter, he does not arrive at a complete statement of what he has heard—for lack of memory.

"But if anyone says that it ought, by the power of the Holy Spirit, to be conceded to the Evangelists never to disagree in the words they use—neither in their order, nor in their number—, such a one fails to see that precisely because the authority of the Evangelists is so pre-

irrelevant. This is in great measure true, but it may be pushed too far. Thus, to take a few instances, we may well ask why—if he were unwilling to weary his Roman readers with Palestinian place-names—he yet mentions Nazareth, II, 39, 51; IV, 16; Capharnaum, IV, 31; VII, 1; Naim, VII, 11; the land of the Gerasenes, VIII, 26; Bethsaida, IX, 10; etc. We can understand that such places as Jerusalem and Jericho should be named even to Romans for they would of course be familiar to them, but what about Naim? Surely the answer is that he found this name in his source? For Luke was not present at this scene; he must then have learnt it from some one who was present, perhaps from the widow, perhaps from her son, perhaps from one of the Apostles; but whoever told him the story also told him that its scene was laid in Naim.

And on the other hand it seems clear that St. Luke was often

eminent we can *a fortiori* claim for them the same certainty as we claim for other men when they speak the truth, so that when perchance several of them relate the same event in no sense can anyone of them be accused of untruthfulness if he does differ, as just said, from another, as can indeed be seen in the preceding example from the Evangelists. For since it is wrong to either think or say that one of the Evangelists had stated an untruth, so also it will appear that neither did he fall into an untruth to whose memory has happened what is shown to have happened to them. And since the higher our character the more we have to beware of untruth, so much the more do we owe it to the King of Supreme Authority not to imagine that we are in the presence of untruths when we find narratives vary amongst themselves so much as do the Gospel narratives. In the same way, too, and this is especially a question of sound doctrine, we must understand that we are to look not so much for truth in words as in things when we declare that they have stood in the same truth who use not the same modes of expression but differ not in facts and ideas.

"What contradiction, then, is there in these narratives from the Gospels which I have compared? Is it that one says: *whose shoes I am not worthy to carry*, while the others say: *the latchet of whose shoe I am not worthy to loose?* For 'to carry the shoes' and 'to loosen the latchet' is not merely a difference of words, or of order of words, or of mode of speech; they are essentially different *things*. We may well ask what precisely John *did* say that he was unworthy of: 'carrying the shoes' or 'loosening the latchet.' For if John did say one of these things then apparently he has told us the truth who has been enabled to tell us what John did actually say; whereas he who tells us the other (what, namely, he did not say), must certainly, if he did not tell us an untruth, have forgotten and told us one thing instead of the other. But it is unfitting

ignorant of *place-names*; they were either not in the 'source' at his disposal, or if he had heard where the event took place he had forgotten it. Thus he is very fond of the expression 'in a certain place' or 'city,' cf. IV, 42; V, 12; IX, 52; X, 38; XI, 1; XIII, 22; XVII, 12; etc. Is it rash to conclude from this that he often did not know where certain events had happened and that, true historian as he is, he purposely made use of a vague expression in order to show that he had no more precise knowledge?

The same conclusion seems to be forced on us by a study of his indications of *time and order*. Thus in II, 2; III, 1;

that there should be any falsehood in the Gospels, and not merely falsehood which consists in telling untruths but also that which is due to forgetfulness. Hence if it is allowable to understand one thing by the words *carry the shoes*, and another by *loosening the latchet*, what else can we rightly think than that John said both, either at different times, or at the same time? For he might have said: 'the latchet of whose shoe I am not worthy to loose, and whose shoes I am not worthy to carry' so that one Evangelist mentioned one part while the other mentioned the other, and yet all of them told the truth. But if when John spoke of the Lord's shoes he meant to indicate no more than his own humility and the Lord's excellence—then whichever of these he actually said—whether it was 'loosening the latchet' or 'carrying the shoes'—conveyed the same meaning and consequently each one of the Evangelists expressed by this reference to the shoes the same indications of humility and consequently, too, did not fail to express John's *intention*." Note particularly what follows:

"We have, therefore, a practical standard and one which we should take pains to remember when treating of the agreement of the Evangelists, namely, that it is no question of untruthfulness when one of them happens to say something which indeed he of whom he narrates it did not—as a matter of fact say—yet he (the writer) nevertheless expresses the speaker's *intention* just as much as he who gives his actual words. And thus we learn in a practical (salubriter) manner that we have nothing else to enquire except what he *intended* who spoke."—*De Consensu*, II, 27-29.

He insists on this doctrine in even stronger terms further on (67): "Rem plane utilissimam discimus, et per necessarium; nihil in cujusque verbis nos debere inspicere, nisi *voluntatem*, cui debent verba servire: nec mentiri quenquam, si aliis verbis dixerit quid ille *voluerit*, cujus verba non dicit: ne miseri aucupes vocum, apicibus quodammodo litterarum putent ligandam esse veritatem; cum utique non in verbis tantum, sed etiam in caeteris omnibus signis animorum, non sit nisi ipse *animus* inquirendus."—Cp. No. 121.

VI, 1; IX, 28 (cp. Matth., XVII, 1, Mark, IX, 1); IX, 37; XIII, 1, 31; he is precise in his indications. But compare with the above notices such passages as VI, 6; VIII, 22; XV, 1; XVI, 1; XVII, 20; XVIII, 1, 9; XX, 1; etc. It will be seen that the majority of these instances of vagueness occur in the Perean section. This is interesting since it agrees with what we should have expected regarding that period of Our Lord's ministry. Unlike the period of Galilean or Judean preaching the Perean ministry was not exercised in the full light of Pharisean Judea. It was done 'beyond Jordan' and at a period when it was convenient for the Messias to keep out of reach of His enemies, cf. Luke XIII, 31-35.

* * * * * * *

But it will be asked: how do the above statements accord with the inspiration of the Evangelist? Is inspiration compatible with ignorance? Remembering that ignorance is not error, we must answer in the affirmative. And the reason is clear: *inspiration is not revelation.* But to say that inspiration is compatible with ignorance is not at all the same thing as to say that it is compatible with error. Not to know something is one thing, to hold something as true which is not so is another. But—it may be objected—if it can be shown that the Evangelists are guilty of ignorance, when can we trust them? To be *guilty* of ignorance, however, and to be *ignorant* are quite different things. A man may be ignorant of a great many things and yet not *guilty* of such ignorance. For guilt only comes in when a man is ignorant of what he ought to know, or when he pretends to knowledge which he has not really got. But St. Luke was under no obligation whatever to know all the details of time and place in the story of Our Lord's ministry; neither does he pretend to know them. And this is precisely what we have tried to point out. When he does know he tells us so in clear fashion and there is no doubt about his meaning; when he does not know he shows this by the use of certain expressions which with him are almost

stereotyped: 'on another Sabbath,' 'on a certain day,' 'into a certain town,' etc.[11]

And the above remarks will apply to those places where St. Matthew, for example, has grouped together facts which the other Evangelists show us did not take place simultaneously. For we shall be asked: if St. Matthew tells us that there were *two* demoniacs and *two* blind men whereas there were not two but only one on that precise occasion—has he not deceived us? The answer must presumably be that St. Matthew never meant us to gather this from his narrative. This sounds startling. But it is the literary problem over again. Before we can ascertain the precise value which is to be attached to a particular passage or statement we must make up our minds as to the precise character of *the whole book*. What is St. Matthew's Gospel? Is it a history conceived in the modern style? It is cast in an historical mould it is true, but that is no more than to say that a certain order of development is followed. St. Matthew traces Our Lord's ministry from start to finish, *i. e.*, he brings Him from Galilee to Jerusalem just as St. Peter sketches that same ministry, Acts x, 37-42; but there the chronological order stops. This will be evident from the single fact that had we only the first three Gospels we should never have known that the ministry lasted more than one year. In the light of the Fourth Gospel we can see that even the Synoptics leave room for a more extended ministry than we should otherwise have gathered from their narrative—but that is all.

[11] Thus once more note St. Augustine's broad treatment of such difficulties:

"Satis apparet . . . . non nos debere arbitrari mentiri quenquam, si pluribus rem quam audierunt vel viderunt reminiscentibus, non eodem modo atque easdem verbis, eadem tamen *res* fuerit indicata; aut sive mutetur ordo verborum, sive alia pro aliis quae tamen idem valeant verba proferantur . . . . sive ad illuminandam declarandamque sententiam, nihil quidem rerum, verborum tamen aliquid addat, cui auctoritas narrandis concessa est; sive rem bene tenens non assequatur, quamvis id *conetur*, memoriter etiam verba quae audivit ad integrum enuntiare."—*De Consensu*, II, 28.

The truth seems to be that we have become so impressed with the necessity of defending the absolute historicity of the Gospels that we have unconsciously lost sight of the character of each of them individually considered and have thus worked ourselves into an *impasse*. It was not always so. Origen long ago insisted that it was impossible to reconcile the statements of the Evangelists as they stood. So perplexed was he by the apparent inconsistencies displayed that he felt compelled to have recourse to his allegorising methods in order to defend the truth of the story. But Origen was strangely lacking in the historic sense. On the other hand, St. Augustine who was not afraid to have recourse to strange methods of exegesis when statements seemed to conflict [12] took a bolder and freer line as our footnotes show, when attempting a reconciliation of apparent discrepancies in the Gospels.

* * * * * * *

We may conclude by applying the principles stated above to two passages which present certain difficulties for the harmonist. St. Matthew, xxv, 14-30, has given us the parable of the Ten Talents; St. Luke, xix, 11-27, has a strikingly similar parable—that of the Ten Pounds. Similarly, St. Matthew, xxii, 1-14, has the parable of the Marriage of the King's son, while St. Luke, xiv, 16-24, has a similar parable, that of The Great Supper. Advanced rationalistic critics attempt to identify these parables in each case. But the principles laid down above show that such a proceeding is contrary to sound exegesis. For in each case, not only do the details vary, not only are the circumstances different, but each Evangelist gives us definite positive statements regarding time and place which we cannot disregard, for to do so would be to accuse them—not of ignorance of something which they do not profess to know, but of positive misstatements—and these are incompatible with inspiration.

[12] See his amazing explanation of the 'three' days and 'forty' days of Jonas in the Septuagint and Hebrew texts respectively (*De Civitate Dei*, xviii, 44).

Here it may be objected that in spite of our disclaimers we are really insisting on a merely partial inspiration; for it might be concluded from what has been said that we hold that the Evangelists were inspired regarding the substance of the facts narrated, not however regarding the accidentals. This is the very last impression we are desirous of conveying. Inspiration is total; the whole statue comes from the sculptor's chisel and the whole statue comes from the sculptor's brain, hand, etc.; the whole comes from each, but from the one as from the instrumental, from the other as from the principal cause. It is the same with an inspired writing. Nothing, no jot or tittle, can escape the influence of the Inspirer, and all is to be attributed to Him as the principal agent; while at the same time no jot or tittle is to be found which did not emanate from him who wielded the pen. But the instrumental agents are free; their nature is not changed by the fact that they are the recipients of inspiration, and—as the old Scholastic axiom has it—*quidquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur.* And if the inspired agents were ignorant of certain things inspiration does not demand that that ignorance should be removed *unless exact knowledge is requisite for the just presentation of the story.* And who dare say that absolute accuracy in details of time and place were always essentials?

But inspiration demands *inerrancy?* Most emphatically—yes! But we make a mistake when by inerrancy we understand 'unmistakable.' Because a document is inspired—and therefore contains no error,—it in no sense follows that *we* shall never fall into error in our interpretation of it. Because a statement is true its truth is not therefore always on the surface 'so that he who runs may read.' And, finally, truth must always be relative; relative that is to say to the character of the writing in which it is contained. If the first two Gospels are rather summaries of preaching than documents conceived and compiled on historical lines—is their inerrancy exactly the same as that of the third Gospel which sets out to be an historical document?

It is the literary problem over again. We must, from a

careful study of each individual Gospel, ascertain what precisely it sets out to be before we can endeavor to weave a consistent, harmonious narrative out of them all.

We have quoted St. Augustine very often and can hardly do better than conclude with the following striking passage:

Faustus had raised objections to the Gospel-story on the ground that the Evangelists were not consistent with one another. St. Augustine pithily remarks:

"Vellem sane ut aliquis istorum vanorum, qui hujusmodi quaestiunculas quasi magnas calumniose objiciunt Evangelio, narraret aliquid idem ipse bis numero, non falsum nec fallaciter, sed omnino id volens intimare et exponere, et stilo exciperentur verba ejus eique recitarentur; utrum non aliquid plus minusve diceret, aut praepostero ordine, non verborum tantum, sed etiam rerum; aut utrum non aliquid ex sua sententia diceret, tanquam alius dixerit, quod eum *dixisse* non audierit, sed *voluisse* atque sensisse plane cognoverit; aut utrum non alicujus breviter complecteretur sententiis veritatem, cujus rei antea quasi expressius articulos explicasset." —*Contra Faustum,* lib. XXXIII, 8.

HUGH POPE, O. P.

COLLEGIO ANGELICO,
ROME.

BOOK REVIEWS.

La Première Communion, Histoire et Discipline, Textes et Documents, des Origines au XX Siècle, par Louis Andrieux, Vicaire de la Cathédrale de Reims. Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1911. 12mo., 292 pp.

In this volume the author has given to the public an erudite and richly documented commentary on the recent decree, *Quam Singulari,* relating to First Communion. After an extensive and valuable list of sources, he describes in the first six chapters the ancient custom of giving Holy Communion to infants and children of tender years, a custom which obtained down to the twelfth century, when the widespread practise of withholding the chalice from the laity led to its decline and final prohibition. In the next eight chapters, constituting part II, he treats the application of the decree of the Fourth Council of the Lateran to children. This decree, as is well known, declared yearly confession and communion to be binding on all who had reached the years of discretion. The author traces the various interpretations, in theory and in practice, that have been put on that decree as affecting First Communion, from the time of the council down to the present time. There is no reasonable doubt, as the author shows, that the meaning of the decree, as framed by the Lateran Council and renewed by the Council of Trent, was that children should be admitted to confession and communion as soon as they came to the use of reason, and were capable both of discerning what is grievously sinful and of distinguishing the Holy Eucharist from common bread. In this respect, the recent decree, *Quam Singulari,* is but a renewal of the Lateran decree. But when do children, as a rule, attain the age of reason? Here there has been considerable divergence of opinion. The view expressed in the recent decree just mentioned, that the age of reason is about the seventh year, sometimes before, sometimes after, is the one that has prevailed in modern times, due in large measure, it would seem, to the early ripening of the child mind through school training and city life. But in former centuries, when the opportunities of

early mental training were beyond the reach of most children, it may be questioned whether the use of reason was attained by the generality of children at so early an age. A few documents of the thirteenth and following centuries recommend, it is true, First Communion for children as young as seven or eight years. But far the more common view, the view held by most schoolmen and theologians of the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, was that no one year could be designated as the ordinary age of discretion, and that as a rule children did not acquire the use of reason before the tenth to the twelfth, and sometimes the fourteenth year. This point is not so clearly brought out in the present work as the evidence justifies. There are some interesting pages on the influence of Jansenism during the eighteenth century, in consequence of which the custom prevailed in not a few parishes of France of deferring First Communion to the sixteenth, eighteenth, and even twentieth year. How the attempt to fix the minimum age at twelve years for First Communion was checked by the Holy See, and how the original intention of the fathers of the Lateran Council was once more put in force, is told in the eighth chapter.

The last part of the work gives an interesting survey of the catechetical preparation for First Communion which has been exacted during the last eight centuries. The closing pages of the book contain by way of appendices, the French translation of the recent decree on First Communion, the two instructions of Benedict XIII for First Confession and First Communion, the documents discussing the right of the Bishop of Annecy to fix a minimum age of twelve years for First Communion, and lastly the letter of Pius X to his Vicar General on the preparation of the children of Rome for First Communion.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Life and Writings of Right Reverend John B. Delany, D. D., by G. C. D. Lowell, Mass., Lawler Printing Co., 1911. 8vo., 452 pp.

A good biography is always interesting reading. It is doubly valuable when it is at the same time the biography of a good man.

In the present volume both these conditions are verified. Bishop Delany, whom the reviewer had the good fortune to know personally, was one of nature's noblemen, elevated by the grace of God to the perfection of a high-minded and faithful priest. He was a man of many admirable traits of character, with a mind keenly interested in all that makes for true Christian culture, with a heart full of zeal for the best interests of religion, full of love for Church and Country, full of sympathy for God's children and God's poor. The story of his life is methodically told, in which we see his character unfolded like a beautiful flower, through the years of his boyhood, of his seminary and priestly life, and of the all too short period of his activity as bishop of Manchester. The story is given a particular interest by its numerous personal touches, contained in the familiar letters which he wrote from abroad to relatives and friends, and which reveal a happy mingling of seriousness, humor, optimism, a deep sense of religion, and a keen appreciation of current events. It is an inspiration to read the pages that describe his last hours, in which he rose superior to pain and to the disappointment of a promising career so suddenly cut short, dying as he had lived, a hero. The closing pages of the volume present to the reader the choicest of the numerous poems that came from his facile pen.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Was ist uns Christen die Bibel? von Dr. Kapistran Romeis, O. F. M. Freiburg, B. Herder, 1911. 12mo., 242 pp., 95 cents, net.

This book is written for the educated lay reader, and seeks to present in a popular form the Catholic idea of the inspired Scriptures. From the opening chapter on revelation, the author passes on to the exposition of inspiration, its true nature, the grounds for belief in the inspired Scriptures, and the main characteristics resulting from their inspiration, namely, their authenticity, inerrancy, and trustworthiness as sources of religious knowledge. In connexion with this, some twenty pages are given to the demonstration that the Gospels preserve the verbal teaching of Christ, and that St. John's portraiture of the Incarnate Son of God is identical with the concept of Jesus held by the other apostles and

is undoubtedly true. The last chapter shows that the reverent study of the Scriptures has from the earliest times been held in honor by Church authorities, and seeks to encourage the lay reader to turn frequently to the Bible for spiritual refreshment and edification. A list of popular German versions of the Bible, including the best illustrated editions, brings the volume to a close.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Divine Trinity: A Dogmatic Treatise by the Reverend Joseph Pohle, Ph. D., D. D. Authorized English version with some abridgment and numerous additional references by Arthur Preuss. B. Herder. St. Louis, 1912. Pp. 297.

This treatise on the Divine Trinity by the Reverend Doctor Pohle, formerly professor of fundamental theology in the Catholic University of America, and now professor of dogma in the University of Breslau, is a welcome companion to the first volume published in 1911 under the title: "God: His knowability, essence, and attributes." The author begins by tracing the obscure references to the dogma in the Old Testament with a view to showing that this great truth of faith was foreshadowed from the very beginning of the Jewish Covenant and not announced suddenly in the New Testament. Then follow in order studies of the dogma in the New Testament, in tradition, in the official liturgy of the Early Church and the private prayers of the faithful —to which are added chapters on the Divine processions, the theological development of the dogma, and the consubstantiality of the Three Divine Persons.

This summary recital of the contents does not give the reader an adequate idea of the interesting questions treated in this volume. It is invidious to single out for special praise one portion of the treatment rather than another. Suffice it to say that the reader will find edification as well as enlightenment in the discussion of the famous text concerning the "three heavenly witnesses," and in the section on the development of dogma. These are timely and important, in view of current misunderstandings, not to say, misrepresentations.

An abundant bibliography accompanies each topic treated. Not-

withstanding the condensation necessary in a work of this nature, the clearness is admirable. The English version does credit to the translator. It is a volume which priests should have in their library, and one which should not be placed on the shelves until it has been read and studied. It is a work to be put in the hands of those who come for advanced instruction, and we recommend it to all as a succinct and learned treatment of the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Un umanista teologo Jacopo Sadoleto. S. Ritter. Rome, Ferrari, 1912. Pp. 184.

This volume contains an appreciation of the pastoral and literary labors of Cardinal Sadoleto, the humanist theologian, and by common consent far more humanist than theologian. It is an interesting account, well and orderly told, its purpose being to show that Sadoleto, although he left no school to perpetuate his memory, bequeathed a method which is still in vogue and a spirit which has entered into modern theology, not, be it said in passing, for the world's good. As a study in origins, therefore, this volume is very valuable. One lays it down with the thought uppermost in mind that coming events cast their shadows before, and that a vast deal may be learned with personal profit from the virtues and defects of this humanistic theologian of the sixteenth century, who meant well in a task for which he was ill equipped. A bibliographical index, copious notes and references, as also a chronological table and a list of personal names enhance the scientific value of the author's investigation and conclusions. At the end of the volume is appended the Cardinal's treatise on original sin, a good specimen of a poor method.

A product of his times in the love of literary flourish and in the disdain of clear-cut thought, Sadoleto undertook to write theology out of his own head, after the pretentious manner of his times which accorded scant courtesy to the wisdom of the ancients. The result may be readily imagined. Ideas as old as the hills, and abandoned time out of mind for their insufficiency were given a new lease of life, under the mistaken impression that they had never been tried before, not to say, found wanting. For instance.

the fundamental thought, running like a central thread through all Cardinal Sadoleto's writings and developed for the first time in his commentary on the epistle to the Romans, is the contrast between the love of God on the one hand and the love of the world on the other. He rings the changes on this one idea incessantly. Original sin is merely the love of the flesh. Justification is the first struggle and victory of the will over the love of things mundane. The redemption is man's liberation from the things of the flesh. Grace is nothing more than the practice of superior virtue by natural powers. Predestination has its causal reason and ground in the beginnings of free will. Not a word about the supernatural. He does not seem to know what the idea meant, as the supersensible is the highest category of which he speaks.

It was the sophism of the humanist then as it is of the modernist now, to look for simple explanations of complex and many-sided facts, like the Christian religion and the meaning of life. The meanest flower that blows lends itself to no such simple analysis as these men pretended and still pretend. But it was the fashion in those days to wipe the slate of history clean and to write things over again to suit one's self. Cardinal Sadoleto fell a victim to this method. A knowledge of the development of thought in the Middle Ages would have saved him from this fate. Unfortunately, his chosen method of ignoring those that went before, and his over-weening desire to think out things for himself, left him a stranger to history. Methods ruin minds as frequently as they train them, and the present instance is a case in point. It all goes to show the truth of the Leonine adage that progress, to be real, must combine and not divorce the old and the new.

This study has many points of interest and instruction for all those engaged in the work of appreciating at its true value the rise of modern theology. In its contempt of the past, in its pretentious simplification of all things, Christianity included, and in its search for novelty as the mark of truth, this theology stands condemned at its very springs. The author has accomplished a difficult task most creditably. His pointing out of the essential and glaring defects of modern theological methods, his criticisms of Cardinal Sadoleto step by step, and his appreciation of whatever good he found in his eminent subject, are all highly instructive. Tolle, lege.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

L'Éternité des peines de l'Enfer dans Saint Augustin. Achille Lehaut. Paris, Beauchesne, 1911. Pp. 205.

This historical study is divided into three parts: the prevailing errors of the time occupy the first, Saint Augustine's refutation of these the second, and his positive exposition of the Catholic doctrine the third. It is a scholarly and thorough piece of research into the history of the doctrine of eternal punishment. Saint Augustine, it is true, does not write as an historian recounting the errors of the day, but rather as a defender of Christian belief. Still, it is possible to read between the lines, and in this indirect way discover whether Saint Augustine himself is proposing the objections to forewarn and forearm the faithful, or reciting the hostile views of others. It is by this careful method of procedure that the author distils history out of his sources. There is nothing arid about the presentation; on the contrary, the liveliness of the style sustains one's interest unflagging to the end.

There was first to be considered the idea—attributed to Origin—of a universal final restoration, based for the most part on philological grounds, and refuted by Saint Augustine on these same grounds, supplemented by an appeal to the Scriptures, especially to the text of Isaiah "their worm dieth not," and to the manner in which the Church had always understood and interpreted the meaning of the last judgment.

Then there was the theory of mercy which made light of the Scripture threats of everlasting punishment, and extended salvation finally to all, or withheld it from the merciless and uncharitable only. Saint Augustine demolished the argument based on the divine promises of life to all, by showing that the divine threats of everlasting spiritual death to sinners were equally a part of the Scripture record, and could not be impugned without calling the whole in question.

After the bleatings of the sheep of the fold had been reduced to silence, there remained to be considered the arguments proposed by the unbelievers. The physical objection to the doctrine of endless chastisement was that bodies could not live in fire. It was against nature to suppose that they could. To this the great Doctor made the reply that it was man's theories of nature, and not nature itself, which rendered the doctrine of endless punishment incredible.

And then there was the moral argument that justice forbade a punishment out of all proportion with the fault or offense committed. The parity between human justice and divine was urged in support of this point to clinch it. Saint Augustine denied the parity, and showed that in sin there is an adherence to evil, which lasts until the will itself yields, and that may be never. Not content with this reply, he plunges into a profound analysis of human malice, and finds the reason for questioning eternal punishment in the lack of a proper sense and appreciation of the seriousness of sin. Was Saint Augustine acquainted with the medicinal theory of punishment which holds that the true end of all chastisement is reform? He mentions it in one passage, but pays no further attention to the problem which it suggests—a sure sign that it was not a current objection on the lips of his opponents. It was much later that this objection began to go the rounds, Origin himself, to whom the theory also occurred, not having realized its full drift, whatever Turmel may think to the contrary.

It is impossible to follow the author into the positive side of the exposition, the restricted space at our disposal forbidding our doing so. Suffice it to say that the full thought of the great Doctor loses none of its vivid glow in this admirable scientific re-presentation. In the sentimentalism of our times, when this doctrine of the heinousness of sin and the endlessness of its chastisement is in danger of being depreciated, it is good to have set before us the words of a giant mind in all their bearings. The author has accomplished his task most creditably in this contribution to the history of theology, and we wish him well with his work.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Introductory Philosophy. A text-book for Colleges and High Schools. By Charles A. Dubray, S. M., Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy at the Marist College, Washington, D. C. New York, Longmans, 1912. Pp. xxi + 624. Price $2.60.

The greatest difficulty which teachers of philosophy encounter is the inability of the average student to realize the problems of philosophy as problems. In other words, the teacher finds that the pupil is already convinced of the truths of philosophy, that

the work of proving them is labor wasted, that he must first develop an interest in the problem before he can engage the attention of his class. One of the many good qualities of Doctor Dubray's book is that it facilitates this task. It justifies the title, *Introductory Philosophy,* by showing the way to the problems of philosophy, by pointing out the paths which lead to philosophy from science, literature, history and human experience in general. The historical presentation of the problems of philosophy has very great advantages from the point of view of interest to be cultivated and attention to be secured. But sound method requires that the historical presentation be supplemented by systematic discussion. Doctor Dubray's book is an excellent aid to the latter and will undoubtedly recommend itself both to teachers and students.

Introductory Philosophy while it is a textbook and, as such, keeps in view the needs of the beginner in philosophy, is more than a mere compilation. In manner and method it is a departure from the time-honored manual, and by reason of its originality of presentation will interest many who, perhaps, have decided to close their textbooks for good, and seek inspiration among the philosophical essayists and the writers of philosophical classics. The book will interest the mature student, as well as the beginner. It will show how, in accordance with the instructions of Leo XIII, the modern exponent of scholasticism brings forward " New things and old," and knows how to combine the principles of Thomistic philosophy with what is true in modern philosophy and established as the result of scientific investigation. While we congratulate the author on the success he has achieved, we cannot but call attention to this additional indication of what the Catholic University is doing to assist our schools and colleges in their laborious task. *Introductory Philosophy* is a credit to the University as well as to the author.

WILLIAM TURNER.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Commencement Exercises, 1912.

Commencement Week at the Catholic University began on Baccalaureate Sunday, June 2, when Solemn Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by the Rt. Rev. Denis J. O'Connell, D. D., Bishop of Richmond, Va., and former Rector of the Catholic University. The Sermon was delivered by the Rev. William J. Fitzgerald, J. U. D., of Milville, N. J., President of the Catholic University Alumni Association. On Wednesday morning, June 5, the Twenty-Third Annual Commencement and Conferring of Degrees took place in the Assembly Room, McMahon Hall, the Rt. Rev. Rector of the University presiding. The Deans of the Schools of Sacred Sciences, Philosophy, Letters, Science, and the Sisters College presented 96 candidates for degrees. The exercises closed with an address by the Rector.

Degrees were conferred as follows:

In the School of Sacred Sciences, for the degree of *Bachelor of Sacred Theology* (S. T. B.): Rev. Leo Thomas Ennis of Brooklyn, N. Y.; Rev. Francis Aloysius Fadden, of New York City; Rev. Joseph Hafford, New York City; Rev. Robert Thomas Riddle, of Philadelphia, Pa.; Rev. Stanislaus Zmijewski, of the Order of Friars Minor; Rev. Joseph Thomas Barron, of St. Paul, Minn.; Rev. Francis James Rakowski, of St. Paul, Minn.; Rev. Vincent Joseph Ryan, of Fargo, So. Dakota; Rev. Theodore Christian Peterson, Rev. Henry Francis Riley, Rev. John Elliot Ross, Rev. Hugh Anthony Swift, of the Paulist Congregation; Rev. Edward Peter McGrath, Rev. Louis Alphonsus Pelletier, and Rev. James Teynac Reilly, of the Society of Mary; Rev. James Joseph Quinlan, and Rev. William Peter Lennartz, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross.

For the Degree of *Licentiate in Sacred Theology* (S. T. L.): Rev. Sigourney Webster Fay, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "The Rise and Development of the Christian Doctrine of the Supernatural."

Rev. John Joseph Finn, of Albany, N. Y., Dissertation: "Christianity and the Theories of Social Progress."

Rev. Michael Ambrose Gilloegly, of Scranton, Pa., Dissertation: "The Present State of the Divorce Controversy."

Rev. Francis Henry Kehlenbrink, of St. Louis, Mo., Dissertation: "The Ordinary Convalidation of Marriage."

Rev. William Peter McNally, of Philadelphia, Pa., Dissertation: "The Ecclesiastical Policy of Otto the Great."

Rev. Philo Laos Mills, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "The Meaning of 'Peithomai' in the Greek Bible."

Rev. Paul John Ritchie, of St. Louis, Mo., Dissertation: "The Diocesan Synod."

Rev. Paul Sandalgi, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "De Orientalibus Vagis."

Rev. Celestine Paul Smith, of the Order of St. Benedict, Dissertation: "The History and Morality of the Oath."

For the Degree of *Bachelor of Canon Law* (J. C. B.): Rev. John Joseph Clifford, of Los Angeles, Cal.; Rev. Thomas Patrick Durkin, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Francis Aloysius Fadden, of New York City; Rev. John Joseph Featherston, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Celestine Anthony Freriks, of the Congregation of the Most Precious Blood; Rev. Michael Ambrose Gilloegly, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Godfrey Francis Kuratko, of San Antonio, Texas; Rev. George Joseph Hafford, of New York City; Rev. Thomas Francis Kelly, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Francis Patrick Lyons, of the Paulist Congregation; Rev. William Michael McGuire, of Rockford, Ill.; Rev. Thomas Joseph McHugh, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. James Joseph Mulholland, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. James Bernard O'Brien, of Providence, R. I.; Rev. George Michael Sauvage, of the Holy Cross Congregation; Rev. Celestine Paul Smith, of the Order of St. Benedict; Rev. Owen Joseph Smith, of Brooklyn, N. Y.; Rev. Hugh Anthony Swift, of the Paulist Congregation; Rev. William Turbiaux, of Duluth, Minn.

For the Degree of *Licentiate in Canon Law* (J. C. L.):

Rev. John Ignatius Barret, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "The Impediment of Sacred Orders."

Rev. Andrew Joseph Carroll, of San Francisco, Cal., Dissertation: "Extrajudicial Methods as Applied to Ecclesiastical Legislation."

Rev. John Joseph Clifford, of Los Angeles, Cal., Dissertation: "Excommunication."

Rev. Edward Patrick Dalton, of Albany, N. Y., Dissertation: "The Impediment of Age."

Rev. Michael Joseph Galvin, of Los Angeles, Cal., Dissertation: "Appeals."

Rev. Leo Ligouri McVay, of Providence, R. I., Dissertation: "The Matrimonial Impediment of Reverential Fear."

Rev. Thomas Joseph Toolen, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "Witnesses."

For the Degree of *Doctor of Philosophy* (Ph. D.):

Rev. William Francis Cunningham, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, Dissertation: "The Basis of Realism."

Rev. Joseph Francis Rhode, of the College of the Holy Land, Dissertation: "The Arabic Versions in the Church of Egypt."

Rev. John Elliot Ross, of the Paulist Congregation, Dissertation: "Social Obligations of Consumers."

Rev. Daniel Joseph McDonald, of Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Dissertation: "The Radicalism of Shelley and its Sources."

Rev. Ignatius Albert Wagner, of the Congregation of the Most Precious Blood, Dissertation: "The Condensation of Acetone by Means of Calcium Carbide."

For the Degree of *Master of Philosophy* (Ph. M.): Louis Joseph Bour, of the Paulist Congregation, and Julius John Weber, of Wilkes Barre, Pa.

For the Degree of *Master of Arts* (A. M.): Maurice Vincent Cummings, of Olyphant, Pa.; Rev. John Henry Fitzgerald, of Milwaukee, Wis.; Eugene Sinclair Quay, of Washington, D. C.; Rev. Peter Matthew Wilkin, of Rockford, Ill.; Herbert Francis Wright, of Washington, D. C.; Robert Marcellus Wagner, of Sidney, Ohio; Rev. James William O'Keefe, of the Order of St. Benedict.

For the Degree of *Bachelor of Arts* (A. B.): Terry de la Mesa Allen, of Pensacola, Fla.; Charles Callan Tansill, of Washington, D. C.; James Bergen Dempsey, of Albany, N. Y.; Frederick Conrad Dietz, of Oberlin, Ohio; Christian James McWilliams, of Brooklyn, N. Y.; John Joseph Phillips, of New York City; Thomas Noxon Toomey, of St. Louis, Mo.; John Patrick Treacey, of Marlboro, Mass.

For the Degree of *Bachelor of Science* (B. S.): John Edwards, Jr., of Washington, D. C.; John James Greer, of Washington, D. C.; Rev. Stephen Joseph Zmich, M. D. A., of Washington, D. C.; Frank Henry Butt, of Washington, D. C.

In Sisters College, for the Degree of *Bachelor of Arts* (A. B.): Sister Mary Camillus, Sister Mary Irma, of the Sisters of Mercy, Chicago, Ill.; Sister Mary Columbkille, of the Sisters of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas; Sister Mary Germaine and Sister Leo, of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, of Scranton, Pa.; Sister Mary Aquinata, Sister Hilarine, of the Sisters of Divine Providence, Newport, Ky.; Sister Thomas Aquinas and Sister Mariola, of the Order of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis.; Sister Mary Crescentia, Sister Mary Antonia, Sister Mary Columba, Sister Mary Regina of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa; Sister Agnes Clare, Sister Mary, Sister Ignatia, Sister Mary Ignatia, Sister Genevieve, of the Sisters of Providence of St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Terre Haute, Ind.

Letter of Dr. Max Pam.

Dr. Max Pam, a well-known Jewish-American Lawyer of Chicago, has founded five scholarships in the Catholic University at Washington, for the study of the Social Sciences, and in the following remarkable letter to Cardinal Gibbons he sets forth the reasons for this benefaction:

2001 Empire Building,
New York, *June* 1, 1912.

Your Eminence:

It gives me pleasure to hand you herewith check covering the first of five scholarships each being in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars, established by arrangement with Your Eminence in the Catholic University of America, for the purposes hereinafter indicated. The remaining scholarships shall be remitted for, one each during the next four years.

First. The holders of the scholarships are to take at least one of their studies in the department of sociology, with a view to studying the social and economic conditions in the interest of the well-being of the nation.

Second. The holders of the Scholarships are to be students, whom, during my lifetime, I shall designate, after consultation with the officers of the Catholic Church Extension Society at Chicago, and the Rector of the University, reserving, however, the right to arrange with the Board of Trustees for a change in the method of designation whenever in my judgment it may seem necessary or wise. After my death the designation or nomination of these students shall be made by the Executive Committee of said Catholic Church Extension Society in consultation with the Faculty of the Catholic University of America at Washington, D. C.

Third. Each scholarship shall be limited to three years, subject, however, to extension to a period of four years on the recommendation of the Rector of the University.

The reasons and motives impelling me to found these scholarships are as follows:

The spirit of "live and let live" has been the dominant characteristic of our people up to the present time. From a material standpoint we have been very fortunate. A land of boundless resources and manifold opportunities, the struggle for existence has been deprived of the hard features which characterize it in most other countries. But conditions are rapidly changing. A phenomenal increase in population is straining our resources more and more each year, and opportunities are proportionately decreased. As a result of these changed conditions the spirit of "live and let live" must sooner or later yield to that individual selfishness begotten of a more intense struggle for existence unless another and higher spirit, the spirit of LIVE AND HELP LIVE, comes to its aid. We are not and should not be, in any state, individual units, seeking our own selfish ends, and concerned only with what affects our own personal welfare.

LIVE AND HELP LIVE should be the true patriot's motto. Rich and poor have fought side by side to save this country and to give it freedom. They have worked together to upbuild it. The rich of today are the poor of yesterday. There is no dividing line of blood between them and none of the artificial distinctions of caste and class which are to be found in older civilizations. And I do believe there is less class hatred in America today than in any country under the sun. Our men of wealth, as a class, have shown themselves to be unselfish and patriotic and American philanthropy is a world's wonder at the present moment.

Every European country today is face to face with grave economic problems. Our turn is coming; in fact, it is a grave question if it be not already here. We hear advanced, from time to time, new and strange theories of government. There are some who claim, even at the present hour, that the Constitution has outlived its usefulness. In spite of assertions to the contrary, I am strongly convinced that the spirit of our people is sane, conservative and just. There is plenty of respect for law and order, consideration for the rights of others and a general realization that the millennium promised by political visionaries will not arrive in a week or a year. The people at bottom are right, but they need wise and honest leadership.

False Leadership is the Nation's Real Menace.

To avert this latter danger we must have men who are qualified by training and integrity to meet and oppose it whenever and wherever it appears. It is my conviction that it is the people themselves who must supply this leadership. In my humble way I want to help talented young men to fit and qualify themselves for this work and therefore it is with great pleasure that I am, with your consent, establishing these five scholarships with the understanding that the young men who will be chosen for these scholarships will make a special study of social and economic problems. These problems, as I conceive it, will center round man's relation to man, man's relation to government, and man's relation to property.

The Catholic Church holds to the traditions of the past; it is conservative; it stands for authority, for government, for the rights of the individual and for the rights of property, and these to my mind are the chief elements that enter into individual and national happiness; it has the largest number of communicants of any religious institution in the country; it has the opportunity of moulding character, developing the intelligence and creating a proper sense of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, not only amongst those who are citizens at the present moment, but amongst the millions who will come from other lands, seeking better opportunities and more favorable conditions of life.

I do not believe in helpfulness which leads to lack of self-reliance, destroys individual ambition and makes drones instead

of producers. I believe that all right-thinking people are as opposed to predatory poverty as they are to predatory wealth. I believe in religious education which quickens the conscience to a sense of its responsibilities. I believe in the country's future and have faith that the people properly educated and wisely led will solve their problems as they arise; and with the spirit of religion finding permanent place in thought and conduct, both in private and public life, the liberties and happiness of the people are secure.

In conclusion, Your Eminence, permit me to express the hope that the young men who will receive a higher education as a result of this foundation will reflect credit upon their Alma Mater and will, under your care, develop that type of character which makes for all that is best in the Nation's life.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) MAX PAM.

To HIS EMINENCE,
JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS,
Chancellor of the Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

University Degrees for Sisters.

This year for the first time the Catholic University of America has awarded to representatives of our Sisterhoods the honors that are attached to academic degrees. At the Commencement exercises on June 5, the Baccalaureate in Arts was conferred on eighteen candidates, members of Sisters College, representatives of seven of our leading teaching communities.

The usual time requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the representative universities of the country is 2,160 class hours of collegiate work, taken after the completion of a standard high school course of four years. In this University the minimum requirement is 2,176 hours. The candidates from the Sisters College have a record of college work ranging from 2,176 to 3,408 hours and averaging 2,733 hours, or thirteen hours more than five years of work. The candidates are as follows:

Sister Mary Regina, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college courses taken 28, number of class hours 2,176, experience in teaching 20 years in the high school.

Sister Mary Columba, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college courses taken 24, number of class hours 2,208, experience in teaching 24 years of high school.

Sister Mary Columbkille, Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas, number of college courses taken 32, number of class hours 2,336, experience in teaching 2 years in primary grades, 5 years in grammar grades, 2 years in high school.

Sister Mary Germaine, Congregation of the Sisters-Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Scranton, Pa., number of college courses taken 32, number of class hours 2,368, experience in teaching 18 years high school, 12 years as inspector of the schools conducted by the Congregation in the diocese of Scranton.

Sister Thomas Aquinas, Sisters of the III Order of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis., number of college courses taken 28, number of class hours 2,464, experience in teaching 2 years grammar grades, 8 years high school, 3 years normal school.

Sister Mary Irma, Sisters of Mercy, Convent of Our Lady of Mercy, Chicago, Ill., number of college courses taken 39, number of class hours 2,562, experience in teaching 20 years in high school.

Sister Mary Crescentia, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college courses taken 22, number of class hours 2.592, experience in teaching, 18 years high school and 6 years high school principal, 6 years normal training school.

Sister Mary Genevieve, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 34, number of class hours 2,610, experience in teaching grammar grades 2 years, normal training school 1 year.

Sister Mary Leo, Congregation of the Sisters-Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Scranton, Pa., number of college courses taken 39, number of class hours 2,620, experience in teaching 16 years in high school.

Sister Mary Camillus, Sisters of Mercy, Convent of Our Lady of Mercy, Chicago, Ill., number of college courses taken 38, number of class hours, 2,684, experience in teaching 7½ years in high school.

Sister Mary Antonia, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college

courses taken 28, number of class hours 2,720, experience in teaching 18 years high school, 5 years in normal training school.

Sister Mary Ignatia, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 41, number of class hours 2,770, experience in teaching 1½ years grammar grades, 6 years high school.

Sister Ignatia, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 41, number of class hours 2,784, experience in teaching 2 years grammar grades, 2½ years high school.

Sister Agnes Clare, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 48, number of class hours 3,004, experience in teaching 14 years high school and college, 2 years normal school, 6 years high school principal. Author of a Brief Compendium of General Literature and Eleanor C. Donnelly, a school classic.

Sister Mariola, Sisters of the III Order of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis., number of college courses taken 35, number of class hours 3,168, experience in teaching 8 years high school.

Sister Mary Aquinata, Sisters of Providence of Kentucky, Newport, Ky., number of college courses taken 20, number of class hours 3,296, experience in teaching, 4 years grammar grades, 4 years normal school.

Sister Mary Hilarine, Sisters of Providence of Kentucky, Newport, Ky., number of college courses taken 21, number of class hours 3,392, experience in teaching 2 years grammar grades, 3 months normal school.

Sister Mary, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 36, number of class hours, 3,408, experience in teaching 1½ years high school, 5 years normal school.

These Sisters are qualifying for work as teachers in our colleges, academies and parochial schools. In many instances, however, they will remain in the University to fulfill the conditions prescribed for the obtaining of higher degrees.

Meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities.

On September 22, 23, 24 and 25 the Second Biennial Meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities was held at the Catholic University of America.

The officers of the Conference are:

Honorary President:

His Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons

President:

Rt. Rev. Monsignor T. J. Shahan
Rector Catholic University

Treasurer: Hon. William H. De Lacy

Secretary: Rev. Dr. Wm. J. Kerby

Vice-Presidents:

DeCourcy, Hon. Chas. A.....Lawrence, Mass.
Desmond, C. C.....Los Angeles, Cal.
Grehan, John A.....New Orleans, La.
Hagan, John C.....Richmond, Va.
Kelly, Mrs. Thomas H.....New York, N. Y.
Kennedy, James F.....Chicago, Ill.

Executive Committee

Rt. Rev. Monsignor T. J. Shahan, *Chairman*
Washington, D. C.

Rev. Dr. Wm. J. Kerby, *Secretary*.....Washington, D. C.
Butler, Edmond J.....New York, N. Y.
Boyle, Rev. P. H.....Little Rock, Ark.
Carpenter, Hon. Paul.....Milwaukee, Wis.
Crane, Richard.....Cincinnati, Ohio
Flaherty, James A.....Philadelphia, Pa.
Gonner, Lawrence.....Dubuque, Iowa
Hisky, Thomas Foley.....Baltimore, Md.
MacMahon, Mrs. John.....Chicago, Ill.
Molamphy, Mrs. J. M.....Pittsburgh, Pa.
Murphy, Daniel B.....Rochester, N. Y.
Ryan, Rev. Dr. John A.....St. Paul, Minn.

Taylor, Mrs. Thomas.....Austin, Tex.
Tilley, David F.....Boston, Mass.
Waldo, Miss E. A.....New Orleans, La.
Wingerter, Dr. Chas.....Wheeling, W. Va.

COMMITTEE ON ORGANIZATION

Rt. Rev. Mgr. Shahan
Edmond J. Butler
Hon. Wm. H. De Lacy
James A. Flaherty
Thomas Foley Hisky
Rev. Dr. William J. Kerby

COMMITTEES

COMMITTEE ON NEEDY FAMILIES

Chairman,

Robert Biggs, Baltimore, Md.

First Vice-Chairman,

Mrs. James Hugh Hackett, Milwaukee, Wis.

Second Vice-Chairman,

John Rea, Philadelphia, Pa.

Rev. John Brophy, Manchester, N. H.
Miss Mary I. Hoxsey, St. Louis, Mo.
Rev. Henry A. Geisert, Jefferson City, Mo.
Peter Lehman, Milwaukee, Wis.
Mrs. John MacMahon, Chicago, Ill.
Miss Mary V. Merrick, Washington, D. C.
Miss Teresa R. O'Donohue, New York City.
Thomas G. Rapier, New Orleans, La.
Rev. H. J. McDevitt, Portland, Oregon.
Richard M. Reilly, Lancaster, Pa.
Rev. M. J. Scanlan, Boston, Mass.
Mrs. C. P. Trask, Indianapolis, Ind.
Miss Mary E. Shinnick, Cincinnati, Ohio.
W. J. Vavra, Chicago, Ill.

COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT CHILDREN

Chairman,

Mrs. Thomas Hughes Kelly, New York City.

First Vice-Chairman,

Edward J. Du Mee, Philadelphia, Pa.

Second Vice-Chairman,

Miss Stella Hamilton, Omaha, Neb.

Brother Barnabas, Lincolndale, N. Y.
Mrs. Joseph W. Brooks, Baltimore, Md.
Miss Josephine Bleakie, Brookline, Mass.
Mrs. Thomas Burns, Chicago, Ill.
Edward F. Carry, Chicago, Ill.
Mrs. Henry Clark, Jacksonville, Fla.
William J. Doherty, New York City.
James E. Fee, Boston, Mass.
Frank J. Johann, Philadelphia, Pa.
Mrs. John M. Molamphy, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Mrs. W. J. Moorhead, Minneapolis, Minn.
Mrs. Charles P. Neill, Washington, D. C.
Rev. Joseph Ruesing, West Point, Neb.
B. A. Seymour, Detroit, Mich.

COMMITTEE ON DELINQUENT CHILDREN

Chairman,

Edwin Mulready, Boston, Mass.

Vice-Chairman,

Hon. Patrick A. Whitney, New York.

Mrs. W. J. Behan, New Orleans, La.
Rev. James Donahoe, St. Paul, Minn.
D. D. Donovan, Providence, R. I.
M. A. Fanning, Cleveland, Ohio.
Brother Henry, New York City.
Rev. C. Hubert Le Blond, Cleveland, Ohio.
Miss Rose McHugh, Chicago, Ill.
Archibald J. McKinney, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Patrick Mallon, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Rev. Thomas J. Moran, Arlington, N. J.
Brother Paul, Baltimore, Md.
Dr. Mary O'B. Porter, Chicago, Ill.
Rev. C. J. Quille, Chicago, Ill.
Timothy J. Shea, Syracuse, N. Y.

Committee on Dependent Sick

Chairman,

Dr. John A. Horgan, Roxbury, Mass.

Mrs. Thomas H. Carter, Washington, D. C.
J. H. Derse, Milwaukee, Wis.
Miss Margaret E. Durkin, Seattle, Wash.
Dr. Lawrence F. Flick, Philadelphia, Pa.
Leo J. Flynn, Dubuque, Iowa.
Dr. Elizabeth Hocker, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Dr. Harry N. McDivit, Baltimore, Md.
Mrs. James M. McFadden, Dubuque, Iowa.
Mrs. M. J. McFadden, St. Paul, Minn.
Mrs. Edward Mandel, New York City.
Dr. Helen M. Nolen, Toledo, Ohio.
Arthur J. O'Hara, Savannah, Ga.
Dr. James V. Sheehan, Syracuse, N. Y.
Dr. Charles A. Wingerter, Wheeling, W. Va.

Washington Committee on Arrangements

Dennis, Wm. Henry
Devereux, Dr. J. Ryan
Devereux, Mrs. J. Ryan
Downey, Wm. F.
DeLacy, Mrs. Wm. H.
Fuller, John J.
Gallaher, Thomas K.
Galloway, John R.
Galloway, Mrs. John R.
Garges, Mrs. A. B.
Haltigan, P. J.
Hannan, Edw. J.
Harbin, George H.
Johnson, Dr. Louis
Kolb, J. Leo
Lennox, Mrs. P. J.
Mangan, Lawrence
Mankin, James D.
Montgomery, W. E.
Moran, P. T.
Mitchell, F. Edward
McCarthy, Mrs. Charles
McCormick, M. G.
Neill, Mrs. Charles P.
Niland, P. J.
Normoyle, Wm.
Oehmann, Andrew
Pellen, J. J.
Russell, Rt. Rev. Mgr. Wm. T.
Shea, N. H.
Sullivan, Joseph D.
Toomey, Mrs. V. L.
Virnstein, Mrs. Wm.
Weller, M. I.
Woodward, H. E.

The program:

PROGRAM

Sunday, September 22, 1912.

10.00 A. M. Solemn Opening Mass at the Catholic University of America.

Conference Sermon. Rt. Rev. J. F. Regis Canevin, Bishop of Pittsburgh.

3.00 P. M. Meeting of Executive Committee.

8.00 P. M. Public Meeting.

Address of Welcome, Gen. John A. Johnston, Acting President, Board of Commissioners.

The Church in Charity. Rt. Rev. Monsignor Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

The Government in Charity. Mr. Thomas M. Mulry, President of the Superior Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society, New York City.

Charity and Culture. Mr. F. P. Kenkel, Editor of the Social Justice and the Daily Amerika of St. Louis, and Member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bureau of the Central Verein, St. Louis, Mo.

Monday, September 23, 1912.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the Committee on Needy Families.

Chairman's Address. Mr. Robert Biggs, President of Particular Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society; Member Executive Committee, Federated Charities; Secretary Executive Committee of Catholic Immigrants and Sailors Protective Association; Member Committee for Reorganizing Housing Code of Baltimore City; Baltimore, Md.

Desertion and Non-Support. Mr. Patrick Mallon, Probation Officer at Brooklyn Children's Court, Brooklyn, N. Y.

The Pensioning of Widows and Their Families. Miss Mary E. Shinnick, Probation Officer, Cincinnati, Ohio.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

Chairman's Address. Mrs. Thos. Hughes Kelly, Chairman of the Committee on Day Nurseries of the Association of Catholic Charities, New York City.

Present Methods in the Care and Training of Defective Children (deaf, mute, blind, and feeble-minded). Rev. Michael McCarthy, S. J., New York City.

Medical Point of View of Mentally and Physically Defective Children. Dr. Mary O'Brien Porter, Chairman of the Protectorate of the Catholic Woman's League, Chicago, Ill.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DELINQUENT CHILDREN.

Chairman's Address. Mr. Edwin Mulready, Executive Officer and Secretary of the Massachusetts Probation Commission; Secretary-Treasurer of the Massachusetts Branch of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology; Trustee of the Massachusetts State Hospital for Dipsomaniacs at Foxborough, Boston, Mass.

Prevention of Delinquency. Mr. J. J. McLoughlin, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, New Orleans, La

Necessary Legislation. Mrs. Thaddeus J. Medder, Member of the Catholic Woman's League, Chicago, Ill.

Discussion. Opened by Hon. Charles A. DeCourcy, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

2.00 P. M. MEETINGS OF ORGANIZATIONS.

St. Vincent de Paul Society.

Christ Child Society.

The Federation of Catholic Women's Organizations.

Organizations engaged in the work of Protection of Young Girls.

8.00 P. M. THE CITY AND ITS POOR.

The Poor as Victims of Their Material Environment. Dr. Lawrence F. Flick, Founder of the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Tuberculosis; Co-Founder of the Henry Phipps Institute for the Study, Treatment, and Prevention

of Tuberculosis; Ex-President of the International Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis; Philadelphia, Pa.

The Poor as Victims of Their Moral and Social Environment. Miss Katherine R. Williams, Member of the State Board of Control of Wisconsin; Former Member of the Milwaukee Tuberculosis Commission; Chairman of the Committee of Civics and Philanthropy of the Marquette Woman's League; Milwaukee, Wis.

The Legal and Social Protection of the Poor. Mr. James F. Kennedy, President of the Particular Council and Secretary of the Superior Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Chicago, Ill.

Discussion.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1912.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON NEEDY FAMILIES.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Mrs. James Hugh Hackett, President of the Marquette Woman's League, Milwaukee, Wis.

After-Care of Families. Mr. Joseph W. Brooks, Member of Executive Board of St. Mary's Industrial School, and of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, Baltimore.

The Relation of the State to the Convict's Family. Dr. Chas. F. McKenna, Vice-President of the Catholic Home Bureau, New York City.

Home Recreation, Play and Playgrounds Among the Poor. Miss Margaret C. Cummings, Director Recreation Centre for Men and Boys (New York City Board of Education); Former Director of Vacation Playgrounds; Secretary Federation of Catholic Sewing Circles; Member Riverside Council, Charity Organization Society, New York City.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Mr. Edward J. Du Mee, Vice-President of the Central Council, and Chairman of the Almshouse Committee, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

The Legal Aspect of the Problem of Dependent Children. Hon. Michael F. Girten, Former Judge in the Municipal Court of Chicago, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the German Aid Society; Chicago, Ill.

The Federal Children's Bureau. Mr. Richard M. Reilly, President of the Particular Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Harrisburg, Pa.; President of the Society for the Prevention of Tuberculosis in Lancaster City and County; Director of Lancaster Charity Society; Secretary of St. Mary's Orphan Asylum, Lancaster, Pa.

The Immigrant Child.—I. Mrs. Edward Mandel, Secretary of Woman's Auxiliaries to the St. Vincent de Paul Society, Association of Catholic Charities; Secretary of the Local Needs Association of New York City; Member Public Education Association; President of Women's Auxiliary to the Gouverneur Hospital Tuberculosis Clinic, New York City.

II. Rev. Dr. Joseph Corrigan, Superintendent of Catholic Missionary Society of Philadelphia.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT SICK.

Chairman's Address. Dr. John A. Horgan, President of the Central Council of Boston, St. Vincent de Paul Society; Out-Patient Physician of Foxborough State Hospital; Roxbury, Mass.

The Chronic Sick in Their Homes. Robert M. Merrick, M.D., Boston, Mass.

Systematic Vistation of the Sick in Their Homes. Mrs. M. J. McFadden, President of the Guild of Catholic Women, St. Paul, Minn.

Service on Boards Controlling the Disbursement of Funds for the Relief of the Sick. Dr. Helen M. Nolan, Christ Child Society, Toledo, Ohio.

Discussion.

The afternoon is left free in order that Delegates may have opportunity to visit points of interest in Washington.

8.00 P. M. CO-OPERATION IN CHARITY.

Co-operation Among Catholic Charities. Miss Adelaide M. Walsh, Director of the Social Service Department, Children's Memorial Hospital, Chicago; Director Chicago Industrial School for Girls.

Co-operation Among All Charities. Dr. James E. Hagerty, Professor of Economics in the Ohio State University; Columbus, Ohio.

The Parochial School in Relation to Relief Work. Rev. Joseph F. Smith, Superintendent of Catholic Schools in the Archdiocese of New York; President of the Parish School Department of the Catholic Educational Association; New York City.

The Uses of a Catholic Charities Directory. The Secretary of the Conference.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1912.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON NEEDY FAMILIES.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Mr. John Rea, President of the Central and Particular Councils, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

Modern Views and Methods of Treatment of Inebriety. Dr. John A. Horgan, Out-Patient Physician of Foxborough State Hospital, Roxbury, Mass.

The Parish Nurse. A Sister of the Institute of Mission Helpers, Baltimore, Md.

Our Catholic Immigrants. Mr. Wm. J. Vavra, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney in the Court of Domestic Relations; Member of the United Bohemian Charities of Chicago; Chicago, Ill.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Miss Stella Hamilton, Board of Managers of the Christ Child Society; Omaha, Nebr.

The Problem of Dependent Catholic Children in Public Institutions. Rev. Francis X. Wastl, Chaplain at the Philadelphia Hospital for the Sick, Indigent and Insane; Philadelphia, Pa.

The Selection of Children for Placing Out. Mr. Wm. J. Doherty, Executive Secretary of the Catholic Home Bureau, New York City.

The Education of the Dependent Child. Brother Henry,

Director of the New York Catholic Protectory; New York City.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DELINQUENT CHILDREN.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Hon. Patrick A. Whitney, Commissioner of Corrections; New York City.

Causes of Delinquency. Rev. James Donahoe, City Missionary of St. Paul, Minn; Member Charities Conference Committee.

Treatment of Delinquent Children. Mr. Michael Francis Doyle, Vice-President Particular Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society; Philadelphia, Pa.

Discussion. Opened by Judge William H. De Lacy, Juvenile Court, Washington.

At the close of the Conference the following officers were elected to serve during the years 1913 and 1914.

Honorary President, His Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons; President, Rt. Rev. Monsignor T. J. Shahan, Rector of the University; Secretary, Rev. Dr. Wm. J. Kerby, Washington, D. C.; Assistant Secretaries: B. A. Seymour, Detroit, Mich.; Miss S. G. Gaynor of Chicago; Bernard C. Kelley of Boston, Mass.; Treasurer, Hon. Wm. H. De Lacy of Washington, D. C. Vice-Presidents: Daniel B. Murphy of Rochester, N. Y.; Miss Mary V. Merrick of Washington, D. C.; Richard Crane of Cincinnati, Ohio; Mrs. T. J. Meder of Chicago, Ill.; Rev. Joseph Ruesing of West Point, Nebr.; David F. Tilley of Boston, Mass.

The Conference is now engaged in the work of compiling a complete and authentic directory of the institutional and lay Catholic charities of the United States. It is hoped that the work will be completed in 1913.

The report of the first meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities makes a volume of 430 pages. Price $2.00 in cloth binding; $1.50 in paper.

Up to the present, the Conference has been financed by the contributions of its friends and by the sale of the Report. Beginning with the 1912 Conference, it has been found necessary to add paying membership, as follows:

PAYING MEMBERSHIP.....$3.00
Payable every two years.

SUSTAINING MEMBERSHIP.....$10.00
Payable every two years.

Paying and sustaining members will receive a bound copy of the Proceedings without further charge. Sustaining members may receive a second copy without charge, upon application.

The Conference bespeaks active sympathy and support in its work. It asks its friends to send a subscription in either of the manners above indicated, and to make any suggestions or send any information which will improve its efficiency or encourage its efforts to serve the great interests of Catholic charity in the United States.

Address all communications to the National Conference of Catholic Charities, Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Visit of the Apostolic Delegate. His Excellency, the Most Rev. Giovanni Bonzano, Apostolic Delegate to the United States, was entertained by the Rt. Rev. Rector of the Catholic University on May 13. This was the first public appearance of the Apostolic Delegate since his arrival in Washington. At the dinner given in his honor by the Rector the Delegate was officially welcomed to the University by the Rector, who spoke on the intimate relations existing between the University and the Holy See. Monsignor Bonzano responded in English, expressing his appreciation of the reception given him in America and especially in Washington, and his deep interest in the University whose career he has watched from the beginning. After the dinner the professors of the University, the heads of the affiliated colleges, and guests were presented to the Delegate.

Andrew Lang Prize Essay. The Prize offered by the late Andrew Lang for the best Essay on a Homeric topic was won by Mr. Charles F. Tansill, of Brookland, D. C. The contest was open to undergraduate students of the University.

The Summer Session opened on Sunday, July 1st, with a Solemn High Mass in the chapel of Divinity Hall, at which the Very Reverend Doctor Dougherty was celebrant. The Sermon was preached by the Right Reverend Rector. The Session closed on Friday, August 9.

Attendance at the Summer Session. The total registration of students at the Summer Session was 314. Of this number 11 were lay students and 303 religious. The religious represented 26 orders or communities and came from 55 dioceses of the United States and Canada.

Public Lectures. During the Summer Session Public Lectures were given at MacMahon Hall at eight o'clock on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. The lecturers were Reverend Doctors Pace, Shields, Turner and McCormick.

Retreat for Sisters. At the close of the Summer Session a retreat for Sisters was begun. The exercises were conducted by the Reverend Paschal Robinson, O. F. M.

Sisters' College. The first academic building for the Sisters' College is being erected on the grounds of the Benedictine Convent, Brookland. It will be completed for the opening of classes, October 4. It is a building of the "portable" type, and will be moved later to the permanent site of the Sisters' College.

Registration. A week before the formal opening of the University the Registrar reports that every room in Gibbons Hall and Albert Hall is taken. The number of new students will be well over one hundred.